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Previous research efforts aimed at understanding the relationship between 
automation reliability and reliance on the automation have mainly focused on a single 
dimension of reliability, the automation’s error rate (Bailey, 2004; Kantowitz, Hanowiski, 
& Kantowitz, 1997; Sanchez, Fisk, & Rogers, 2004; Wiegmann, Rich, & Zhang, 2001).  
Efforts to understand the effects of additional dimensions, such as types of errors, have 
merely provided suggestions about the effects that automation false alarms and misses 
can have on human behavior (Dixon & Wickens, 2003; 2004).  Furthermore, other 
dimensions of reliability, such as the distribution of errors in time, have been almost 
completely ignored.  The results of this investigation make a critical contribution to the 
theory of automation use as a function of reliability; specifically, the effects of error type 
and the distribution of errors on reliance.  Another objective of this research was to gain a 
better understanding of the age-related factors that affect human-automation interaction.  
To date, it is unclear if age-related differences in automation use stem from cognitive and 
physical age-related declines or from an aversion by older adults to the use of new 
technologies (Kantowitz, Becker, & Barlow, 1993).  In addition to investigating age-
related differences in the use of automation, the effects of domain-experience on human-
automation interaction were also explored.  
A multi-task simulation of an agricultural vehicle was used in this investigation.  
The simulator was composed of two main tasks, a collision avoidance task and a tracking 
task. The collision avoidance task was supported by an “imperfect” automated collision 
avoidance system and the tracking task was performed manually.  The data were 
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analyzed at both the macro- and micro-levels.  The micro-level analyses provided 
valuable insight into the way in which humans’ reliance patterns change over time.  The 
results of this investigation indicated that there are distinct patterns of reliance that 
develop as a function of error type, which are dependent on the state of the automation 
(alarms or non-alarms).  The different distributions of errors across time had an effect on 
the estimates of reliability and subjective trust ratings.  The recency of errors was 
negatively related to perceived reliability and trust.  As far as age-related factors that 
affected human-automation interaction, the current results suggest that older adults are 
able to adjust their behavior according to the characteristics of the automation, although it 
takes them longer to do so.  Furthermore, consistent with previous findings (Johnson, 
2004; Sanchez et al., 2004), it appears that older adults are as willing to use automated 
systems as younger adults, as long as they are reliable enough to reduce workload.   The 
analysis on the effects of domain experience on automation use indicated that those with 
experience operating agricultural vehicles had different tendencies of reliance.  
Specifically, participants with experience operating agricultural vehicles were less likely 
to rely on automated alarms than those without experience.  The results of this 
investigation have important implications in our understanding of how humans adjust 






During unexpected circumstances, where automated systems are most likely to 
behave unreliably, the human is still expected to act as a backup to detect failure events 
and act accordingly to avoid a system error.  Therefore, when attempting to increase the 
performance of a human-automation system, increasing the reliability of the automation 
only makes up half of the solution; the other half is ensuring that humans perform their 
part of the task.  This means that part of the success of a human-automation system 
hinges on understanding and being able to make some predictions about the behavior of 
the human in an automated environment.    
Research on human-automation interaction can be approached by understanding 
the effects of three main types of variables on human behavior.  These variables include 
those that are specific to the automation (e.g., reliability, level of automation), specific to 
the human (e.g., age, experience) and specific to the environment (e.g., cost of an error, 
workload demands).  Irrespective of the types of variables that are studied, the objectives 
of human-automation interaction research field are to a) identify the variables that affect 
human behavior in automated environments; b) identify the degree to which variables 
affect behavior; c) understand, from a psychological perspective, why specific variables 
lead to specific changes in behavior; d) inform human performance theories;  and e) 
inform the design of automated systems to improve the effectiveness of systems.  
To date, there is still uncertainty surrounding the effects of a number of variables 
on human behavior within the human-automation system, such as automation reliability.  
 
 2
While numerous studies have been conducted to understand the effects of automation 
reliability on human behavior, there are still a number of open questions regarding the 
way humans accumulate evidence about the reliability of the automation and how this 
affects their behavior.  Furthermore, the effects of variables specific to the automation 
(i.e., changes in reliability over time and error types) on behavior are still open questions.  
Gaining an understanding of how humans perceive reliability in automated environments 
and how this perception influences behavior can contribute to our understanding of how 
humans accumulate and integrate information over time.  Furthermore, the effects of 
variables specific to the human, such as age and domain experience on the use of 




A common definition of automation reliability used in human-automation 
interaction research is “the number of correct operations divided by the total number of 
operations in which a task is automated” (Xu, Wickens, & Rantanen, 2004, p. 5).  This 
definition is solely based on the percentage of correct actions made by an automated 
system.  In general, there is a positive relationship between automation reliability (the 
percentage of correct actions it makes) and use of the automation; although evidence also 
suggests that the relationship is not linear (Lee & See, 2004; Moray, Inagaki, & Itoh, 
2000; Sanchez et al., 2004).  Similarly, subjective levels of trust and perceived reliability 
have also been found to be affected by automation reliability (Bailey, 2004; Kantowitz et 
al., 1997; Sanchez et al., 2004; Wiegmann et al., 2001).  Therefore, there is ample 
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evidence that as automation reliability degrades— as it makes more errors—trust and use 
of the automation also decline.   
Previous research studies that have focused their efforts on investigating the 
effects of automation reliability on behavior have failed to consider all of the components 
of reliability.  For example, one variable that is commonly overlooked is the distribution 
of errors in time (i.e., when errors occur).  Wickens and Xu (2002) suggested that 
because of the effect this variable can have on the expectations of the human, it is a 
critical component of the relationship between automation reliability and human 
behavior.  Another variable that is commonly overlooked is the type of error that an 
automated system makes.  The literature is laden with mixed findings regarding the 
effects that different types of errors have on human behavior and expectations.  However, 
to date, these findings have not yielded a clear understanding of the psychological 
implications associated with the occurrence of different types of errors. 
  
Type of Automation Error 
 
The types of errors that an automated system makes depend on the Level of 
Automation (Endsley & Kaber, 1999).  The term Levels of Automation (LOA) is used to 
describe the level of support that an automated system provides.  Parasuraman, Sheridan 
and Wickens (2000) suggested that there are four levels of automation: information 
acquisition, information analysis, decision/action selection, and action implementation.  
Within the LOA of information analysis and decision/actions selection, false alarms and 
misses are the two types of errors the automation can generate.  A false alarm occurs 
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when the automation generates a warning or alert in the absence of a true signal.  
Conversely, during a miss, the automation fails to notify the human of a true signal.   
Even though false alarms and misses are both types of errors that are generated 
within the same LOA, they have considerably different characteristics.  By nature, false 
alarms are more salient because they are accompanied by the stimulus that the 
automation generates to produce a warning.  Furthermore, depending on the operational 
environment, the cost of each type of error can vary considerably.  Some have argued that 
automation misses tend to have greater consequences than automation false alarms (Bliss 
& Gilson, 1998), although there are ample examples of systems and situations in which 
an argument can be made that false alarms are most costly (e.g., a false alarm that leads 
to the shooting of a civilian airliner).  Nevertheless, because the two types of errors are 
fundamentally different, one might expect that they have different effects on behavior, 
even when they are equated for cost.    
The potentially different effect of false alarms and misses on human behavior is 
an issue that has received limited attention.  In most studies that have investigated the 
effects of unreliable automation on human behavior, the distinction between false alarms 
and misses is seldom addressed.  Rather, automation false alarms and misses are usually 
combined in experiments, while the effects of other variables are measured (e.g.,  
Dzindolet, Pierce, Pomranky, Peterson & Beck, 2001; Sanchez et al., 2004; Skitka, 
Mosier & Burdick, 1999; 2000).  While a balanced combination of false alarms and 
misses provides a valuable contribution to the understanding of how humans interact with 
systems that are predisposed to making both types of errors, the unique effects of each 
type of error are likely to be attenuated by the presence of the other type of error.    
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Other programs of research have only focused on the effects of one type of error.  
For example, many of the studies that focus on alarm systems typically only use false 
alarms (e.g., Bliss & Dunn, 2000; Bliss, Dunn & Fuller, 1995; Bliss, Gilson, & Deaton, 
1995; Bliss & McAbee, 1995).  Bliss and Gilson (1998) argued that investigating the 
effects of false alarms is critical because they tend to be more prevalent in applied 
contexts than misses.  The most common finding from this area of research is that a high 
number of false alarms usually results in humans ignoring true alarms (Meyer, Bitan, 
Shinar & Zmora, 1999).  This behavior is often referred to as the Cry-Wolf Effect 
(Breznitz, 1984). 
While the research efforts that have exclusively investigated the effects of false 
alarms have contributed to the understanding of human-automation interaction, there are 
some important limitations with a majority of the studies in this area.  The main 
limitation in these studies is that they seldom provide participants with the opportunity to 
verify the validity of alarms before “agreeing” or “disagreeing” with them.  Therefore, 
the Cry-Wolf Effect, which means humans begin to ignore true alarms given the 
possibility of false alarms, is the only way that participants are able to objectively express 
mistrust in the automation.  However, in studies in which participants are provided with 
the opportunity to verify the validity of the automation the Cry-Wolf Effect is seldom 
observed (Sanchez et al., 2004; Wiegmann et al., 2001).  Instead, mistrust is usually 
manifested by an increase in time and effort spent accessing other sources of information.  
This behavior of verifying the validity of the automation by checking another source is 
referred to as non-reliance in the current investigation.  It is worth noting that in a recent 
discussion by Meyer (2004), reliance was defined as the lack of a response by the user 
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during periods when the warning system is idle.  However, Meyer’s definition is 
constrained by the same limitations that bound alarm studies; it does not consider the 
existence of other sources of information that can be used to verify the validity of the 
automation (for a discussion see Sanchez, 2005).    
A very limited amount of research has specifically compared the effects of false 
alarms and misses on human behavior and overall system performance.  In general, the 
available evidence suggests that the prevalence of each type of error has different effects 
on behavior.  However, the experimental manipulations and measures used to assess the 
effects of false alarms and misses have only yielded indirect evidence for this 
phenomenon.  For example, Gupta, Bisantz and Singh (2001) compared the effects of 
false alarms and misses of an adverse condition warning system (ACWS) in a driving 
simulator.  The threshold used to generate an auditory alarm was manipulated to either 
generate a high or a low number of false alarms relative to the number of misses.  True 
alarms were meant to notify the driver of upcoming skids.  It is worth noting that a false 
alarm in this study was defined as an alarm that sounded much sooner than necessary, 
while a miss was defined as an alarm that sounded, but was too late to allow the human to 
react in a safe and timely fashion.  Therefore, from a Signal Detection Theory (SDT; 
Green & Sweets, 1966) perspective there were no true automation false alarms or misses, 
rather, false alarms were early alarms and misses were late alarms.  A pure automation 
false alarm would have consisted of a skid warning in the absence of conditions that 
would have led to a skid, and a pure automation miss would have consisted of a failure by 
the automation to provide a warning in the presence of skidding conditions.  
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The results of Gupta et al. (2001) indicated that the condition with a higher false  
alarm (early) rate led to lower levels of subjective trust on the automation than the 
condition with a high miss (late alarm) rate.  This finding is consistent with those who 
have suggested that the nuisance associated with false alarms leads to lower levels of 
subjective trust relative to misses (Breznitz, 1984).  Furthermore, the driving behavior of 
participants in the Gupta et al. study was slightly affected by the type of error.  In the 
high miss rate condition, drivers showed less steering deviation than in the high false 
alarm rate condition.  This difference as a function of error type provides some evidence 
that drivers in the high miss rate condition were aware that if an alarm were to occur, it 
may be too late to react; therefore, they would benefit from a more conservative driving 
approach to prevent skidding.     
In another driving study, Cotte, Meyer, and Coughlin (2001) manipulated the 
criterion of a collision detection system, while holding the sensitivity of the system 
constant.  In this study, misses by the automation meant no alarm was generated in the 
presence of an obstacle, while false alarms occurred when the alarm became active in the 
absence of an obstacle.  Their results indicated that driving behavior was moderated as a 
function of the automation’s criterion.  In the condition with high false alarm rates, the 
average driving speed was significantly faster than in the high miss rate condition.  This 
difference in driving speed increased throughout the experimental session.  These results 
suggest that drivers in the high false alarm rate condition became aware that while the 
system was likely to generate false alarms it would not miss much; therefore, they could 
increase their driving speed with a high degree of confidence that if an obstacle appeared 
the system would not miss it.  Conversely, the slower driving behavior by participants in 
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the high miss rate condition suggests that they adopted a more conservative behavior as a 
function of the automation’s criterion.    
Because the actual and perceived costs of false alarms and misses can vary 
greatly, it is worth noting that neither the Gupta et al. (2001) nor the Cotte et al. (2001) 
studies reported a payoff structure associated with the task.  The payoff structure could 
considerably influence the effect that each error type has on behavior.  For example, if 
the cost of an error is high (e.g., missile detection system), even with a high false alarm 
rate the human will likely verify all alarms instead of responding to some and ignoring 
others.  Conversely, if there is not a high cost associated with errors (e.g., browsing to a 
“non-secure” website), the human might be more likely to ignore most alarms, whether 
false or true.  Contrary to the findings of Gupta et al. and Cotte et al., other driving 
simulation studies have found that false alarms of collision avoidance systems do cause 
drivers to slow down unnecessarily, while high miss rates do not have a significant 
impact on driving behavior (Maltz & Shinar, 2004).     
In a study that did equate the outcome cost of false alarms and misses, Lehto, 
Papastavrou, Ranney, and Simmons (2000) used a decision aid that notified drivers when 
it was safe to pass a vehicle in front of them.  Participants were rewarded $0.20 for 
successfully passing and were penalized $0.10 for unsafe passing attempts and missed 
passing opportunities.  Their results indicated that a high false alarm rate was more 
detrimental to performance (measured in monetary earnings) than a system with no false 
alarms and a few misses.  However, in this study, the criterion of the system was 
confounded by the sensitivity of the decision aid, which means the condition with no 
false alarms had a higher level of reliability than the condition with the high false alarm 
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rate (~90% and ~70%, respectively).  This disparity in the sensitivity of the decision aid 
across conditions makes any conclusions about differences in behavior as a function of 
error type difficult to discern.  Furthermore, direct measures of reliance and subjective 
trust were not reported.  
In a recent study by Dixon and Wickens (2003), error type was manipulated in an 
unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) simulation.  In this multi-task environment, participants 
were required to detect system failures (visible in a gauges display) with the assistance of 
an automated alarm while performing a tracking task and a target search task.  Their 
experiment included conditions in which the automation was 100% reliable, 67% reliable 
(all misses), 67% reliable (all false alarms), and a control group with no automation.  In 
this study, the 100% reliable automation improved performance across all tasks relative 
to the no automation condition.  For the 67% reliable conditions, detection of system 
failures was worse in the false alarm condition than in the miss condition, suggesting that 
participants experiencing all false alarms began to ignore most of the alarms therefore 
missing a considerable number of system failures.  Detection of system failures was also 
worse in the false alarm condition than in the control (no automation) condition.   
Contrary to the findings of Gupta et al. (2001), Dixon and Wickens (2003) found 
that subjective reliability ratings were higher in the false alarm condition than in the miss 
condition, although in both conditions the actual reliability of the automation was 
underestimated.  Dixon and Wickens also found that in the miss condition, performance 
in one of the concurrent tasks (identifying targets of opportunity) was significantly lower 
than in the false alarm condition.  This effect of error type on concurrent task 
performance suggests that participants in the miss condition were paying more attention 
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to the gauges and neglected some of the concurrent tasks.  It also suggests that, because 
the participants in the miss condition had to monitor the gauges more often, the level of 
workload in this condition might have been higher.  Increased workload is a possible 
explanation for why the miss condition was conducive of lower reliability ratings.   
In an extension of the 2003 study, Dixon and Wickens (2004) used a similar task.  
They included a mostly misses condition (3 misses, 1 false alarm), a mostly false alarms 
condition (3 false alarms, 1 misses) and a balanced condition (1 miss, 1 false alarm).  One 
of the more compelling findings in this study was that the average reaction time to 
respond to alarms was significantly lower in the mostly miss condition than in the mostly 
false alarms condition.  This difference suggests that participants in the mostly misses 
condition reacted to alarms without verifying whether they were going to make the right 
choice or not, while participants in the mostly false alarms condition verified the alarm 
before correcting the failure.  Again, these results suggest a difference in the way humans 
monitor an automated aid as a function of prevalence of error type. 
The subjective trust ratings in the Dixon and Wickens (2004) study did not differ 
as a function of error type and were fairly close to the actual reliability of the automation.  
However, in this study participants were informed a priori about the range of reliability 
levels and about the criterion setting of the automation.  This information, in part, may 
have influenced participants’ behavior and subjective assessments.  Furthermore, the 
authors did not report whether the different patterns of behavior as a result of error type 
were evident from the onset of the experiment or if they developed as a result of 
experience. 
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Does Error Type Affect Behavior? 
 
The evidence from the limited number of studies that have compared false alarms 
and misses does suggest that each error type leads to different patterns of human 
behavior.  While both types of errors reduce trust and reliance on the automation, they 
appear to do so differently.  To date, the efforts of Dixon and Wickens (2003; 2004) have 
produced the clearest evidence for this phenomenon.  Their results suggest that each type 
of error affects the way humans allocate their attention in multi-task environments where 
verification information is available.  However, the measures used in their studies do not 
directly assess the monitoring behavior associated with the automation-supported task.  
Rather, assumptions about where attention is allocated are made by examining the 
performance across the various tasks.  A similar criticism can be made of the driving 
simulator experiments, where inferences about the allocation of attention can be made by 
examining speed control, but no direct evidence of different monitoring behaviors as a 
function of error type is offered (e.g., Cotte et al., 2001; Gupta et al., 2001; Maltz & 
Shinar, 2004).  The evidence discussed so far also suggests that the effects of error type 
on global assessments of trust and perceived reliability are influenced by the amount of 
workload that each generates (Dixon & Wickens, 2003), the salience of the error (Gupta 
et al., 2001; Johnson, 2004), and the cost associated with the outcome of error type (Bliss, 
2003).        
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Time on Task 
 
Another open question associated with the effects of error type is how different 
patterns of behavior emerge through time and experience.  To date, there is a lack of data 
that provide information about how behavior changes as a result of each event, whether it 
is a false alarm, a miss, a correct detection or a correct rejection.  Ideally, humans would 
weight all events—correct or incorrect—equally, which would facilitate predictions about 
human behavior associated with the use of automated decision support systems.  
However, it is likely that the weight assigned to each event changes as a function of 
experience with the system and the frequency of errors within a specific time period.  In 
most of the studies previously discussed in which error type was manipulated, it was 
unclear when automation failures occurred.  The distribution of errors across time could 
potentially influence the effects of error type on behavior.  To begin to understand how 
humans accumulate evidence about the automation’s reliability across time and how 
behavior is subsequently affected, it is critical to analyze this issue at a micro-level, 
where local changes in behavior can be observed. 
 
Does it Matter When Errors Occur? 
  
A considerable number of studies have investigated the effects of reliability on 
human behavior (e.g., Bliss et al., 1995; Maltz & Shinar, 2004; Parasuraman, Molloy & 
Singh, 1993; Rovira, Zinni & Parasuraman, 2002; Sanchez et al., 2004; St. John & 
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Manes, 2002; Vries, Midden & Bouwhuis, 2003; Wiegmann et al., 2001).  In all these 
studies, reliability was manipulated by changing the overall error rate of the automation.  
For example, Sanchez et al. looked at the effects of three levels of reliability (100%, 80% 
and 60%) on reliance and trust.  Each of these levels was descriptive of the overall or 
average reliability across the entire experiment.  However, none of the previously 
mentioned studies presented or even mentioned the distribution of automaton errors 









Figure 1. Illustration of two hypothetical systems with the same average reliability (70%) 
after 10 events but different error configurations through time.  Each point in the graph 
illustrates the average cumulative reliability of the automation up to that point. 
  
Figure 1 illustrates how two systems with the same average reliability (70%) can 
have two different time configurations of error occurrence.  The location of errors within 
a specific range of time can have different effects on the way humans interact with the 
automation and on the overall trust that humans report at the end of a session (Wickens & 
Xu, 2002).  Wickens and Xu would argue that humans interacting with System A (Figure 

























with System B.  This difference in perception is a result of different expectations of the 
automation as a product of experience (Figure 2).  Wickens and Xu argued that the first 
automation failure can result in a more pronounced drop of trust and reliance on the 
automation than subsequent failures.  According to them, the “first failure effect” (p. 8) 
largely depends on the instructions participants receive prior to their interaction with the 








Figure 2. The effects of experience (x-axis) on trust and reliance (y-axis).  Each “S” 
along the x-axis represents a successful event by the automation.  Each “F” represents a 
failure by the automation.  Adapted from Wickens and Xu (2002). 
 
To date, limited evidence supports the existence of the “first failure effect” and 
the impact that it can have on the way humans perceive and interact with the automation 
(for evidence of the first failure effect see Molloy & Parasuraman, 1996; for evidence 
against it see Wickens, Helleberg & Xu, 2002).  However, the possible existence of the 
first failure effect, suggests that the location of errors in time is an important component 
in the relationship between automation reliability and human behavior.  Different 
configurations in the distribution of automation errors across time can have impact on the 
expectations and perceptions of the automation.   
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Age-Related Factors in Human-Automation Interaction 
 
A limited amount of research within the automation domain has investigated the 
effects of age-related factors on automation use.  However, age-related performance 
declines in divided attention, task-switching, and processing speed tasks (for a review see 
McDowd & Shaw, 2000) can shed light on the age-related differences in human-
automation interaction that have been observed to date.  The evidence thus far suggests 
that increased workload that results from age-related declines could be responsible for 
age-related differences in the use of automation.  If workload is defined as “a portion of 
the operator’s limited capacity actually required to perform a particular task” (O’Donnell 
& Eggemeier, 1986, p. 42), then conceivably some of the cognitive declines related to 
age might affect the level of workload in a particular task.  The purpose of automation in 
many cases is to reduce the level of workload for the human; therefore, age-related 
differences in the use of automation could be a product of increased workload resulting 
from age-related declines.   
Because of the lack of automation studies that have manipulated workload while 
including an age grouping variable, the effects of workload on the use of automation by 
older adults can be examined by looking at studies that have manipulated automation 
reliability and age.  Unreliable automation usually leads to increased workload (Johnson, 
2004; Sanchez et al., 2004).  This increase in workload as a function of reliability is 
caused by reduced levels of reliance on the automation, which means that humans have to 
constantly verify the support of automated aids with other information.  There is evidence 
that when reliability is manipulated in a dual-task environment, the performance of older 
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adults in the non-automated task significantly decreases with lower levels of automation 
reliability (60% versus 80%, 100%; Sanchez et al., 2004).  Sanchez et al. also found that 
older adults were more sensitive to decreases in automation reliability.  This increased 
sensitivity to changes in reliability as a function of age was evident through older adults’ 
subjective measures of trust and perceived reliability.  Conversely, the trust ratings and 
reliability estimates of younger adults did not differ between the 80% and 60% reliability 
conditions.  The increased sensitivity to reliability drops by older adults might be a 
product of the increased difficulty in performing two simultaneous tasks when the 
automation’s error rate is higher.   
In another study that might shed some light on whether workload affects the 
interaction of older adults and automation, Johnson (2004) manipulated the type of 
automation error in a dual-task environment and found that the perceived reliability 
estimates of older adults were significantly lower in conditions where false alarms were 
more prominent than misses.  In this study, false alarms brought about higher task 
demands than misses, as participants had to perform an extra step to verify the support 
provided by the automation.  Conversely, in a study using a traffic advisory information 
system (77% reliable), Kantowitz et al. (1997, experiment 1) found that misses affected 
older adults’ trust ratings more than false alarms.  They also found no age differences in 
subjective trust ratings.  However, the task demands, defined by number of simultaneous 
tasks and time pressure, of the Kantowitz et al. study were lower than the Sanchez et al. 
(2001) and the Johnson (2004) studies.   
Overall, there is some evidence in support of the idea that workload is a key 
determinant in the interaction of older adults with automation.  However, in addition to 
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workload, other factors appear to contribute to the likelihood of use of the automation by 
older adults.  In a study of visual detection in a luggage screening task, McCarley, 
Wiegmann, Wickens, and Kramer (2003) found that younger adults benefited from an 
automated aid by increasing their sensitivity relative to the non-automated condition.  
However, older adults’ detection sensitivity did not increase with the presence of the 
automated aid.  Interestingly, the perceived reliability estimates did not differ as a 
function of age.  This study showed that even when both younger and older adults’ 
perceived reliability estimates were similar there were still differences in how the two 
groups used the automation.  Some have suggested that the acceptance and likelihood of 
using new technologies decreases with age (Kantowitz et al., 1993).  However, age-
related factors that might influence automation use have not been well researched.       
The field of automation provides a valuable medium for the study of age-related 
cognitive declines, especially for constructs such as attention and workload.  Overall, 
there is evidence for age-related differences in behavior toward automation.  However, it 
is critical to begin to understand why the patterns of behavior are different as a function 
of age.  One factor that appears to contribute to the age-related differences in the use of 
automation is increased workload, which is a product of age-related declines.  However, 
there could be other factors that affect age-related differences in automation use, such as 




Human-Automation Interaction: Micro-Level Analysis of Behavior 
 
A limited number of studies conducted to examine human-automation interaction, 
have analyzed the effects of reliability on human behavior at a micro level.  A micro-
level analysis of behavior involves an examination of changes in behavior across time.  If 
humans are constantly adjusting their behavior in response to the characteristics of the 
automation, a micro-level analysis can provide critical information about the factors that 
humans are most receptive to and the factors that affect behavior.    
Lee and Moray (1992; 1994) conducted experiments to understand the 
relationship between trust, self-confidence and reliance of an action-implementation 
automated system (an automatic feedstock pump).  With an action-implementation 
automated system the human can reallocate an entire task/function to the automation.  
Lee and Moray (1992) examined how trust changed across participants from trial to trial 
as a function of system failures.  A micro-level analysis revealed that while subjective 
trust was negatively affected by system failures, it recovered promptly in the presence of 
a properly working system.  Furthermore, their analysis indicated that even failures of the 
same magnitude had different effects on subjective trust, depending on when the failures 
occurred and on the reliability of the automation during previous trials.  For example, 
during a long sequence of automation failures (the automation was failing on every trial), 
their results showed that subjective trust actually began to increase (it is likely that 
participants became accustomed to a faulty system).  This finding provides evidence that 
the way humans perceive automation failures changes as a function of the events that 
precede each error.  In their study, when a failure was preceded by other failures it had 
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little effect on a person’s trust of the automation.  Conversely, when a failure was 
preceded by a period of reliable operation, it significantly decreased trust.   
In an extension of their micro-level analysis, Lee and Moray (1994) plotted 
subjective trust, self-confidence, and use of the automatic controller per participant on a 
trial by trial basis.  Participants had the choice between allocating one of the tasks to the 
automatic controller and performing the task manually.  Self-confidence was assessed 
through a self-rating of how well the participant believed he/she could perform the task 
manually.   
The results of the Lee and Moray (1994) study showed that during trials in which 
the difference between trust in the automation and self-confidence ratings was positive, 
most participants relied on the automation.  This analysis also revealed the points in time 
in which the difference between trust and self-confidence went from positive to negative 
and vice-versa as a function of errors.  Their analysis showed that reliance on the 
automation changed as a function of both trust and self-confidence.   
In summary, the micro-level analyses by Lee and Moray (1992; 1994) provided 
valuable insight into the decisions by humans to use automation by choosing to perform 
the task manually or allocate it to the action-implementation automation.  This type of 
micro-level analysis approach might also prove to be valuable for understanding human 
behavior in environments with automated decision support systems.  Specifically, this 
approach can facilitate the distinctions in behavior as a function of false alarms and 
misses by the automation.   
An additional analysis of an experiment conducted by Johnson (2004) revealed 
the potential benefits for a micro-level approach in the context of decision support aids.  
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Johnson’s study specifically examined the effects of false alarms and misses of an 
automated decision aid on trust and reliance.  In a multi-task environment, participants 
received support of an automated aid to help them detect system failures.  They had the 
option to either rely on the automated aid or not rely on it (verifying its support by 
viewing a pair of gauges).  The prevalence of error type was manipulated in three 
conditions: majority misses (9 misses, 3 false alarms), majority false alarms (3 misses, 9 
false alarms), and equal (6 misses, 6 false alarms).   
The results of the Johnson (2004) study indicated that across the entire 
experimental session there were no significant differences in reliance as a function of the 
error type manipulation for the younger adults.  However, when the data were plotted 
across time, a visual inspection suggests that during periods when the decision support 
aid was providing an alert, the false alarm group had a higher non-reliance rate than the 
miss group.  Conversely, during periods when the decision support aid was inactive, the 
miss group had a higher non-reliance rate (see Appendix A for an illustration of the 
micro-level analysis).  However, Johnson’s study was not specifically designed to 
accommodate this type of analysis.  For example, within the majority false alarm 
condition, there is early “contamination” by a miss, which is the second error by the 
automation.  Nevertheless, the patterns observed in these data suggest that a micro-level 
examination of behavior as a function of type of error can lead to a better understanding 
of the effects of error type on reliance.  Gaining this understanding can provide insight 
into the way humans perceive errors and how this perception affects behavioral 




Objectives of the Current Investigation 
 
The objective of this investigation was to gain an in-depth understanding of 
specific variables that affect human interaction with an automated decision support aid.  
Two types of factors that affect human-automation interaction were investigated, those 
specific to the automation (Error Type and Distribution of Errors) and those specific to 
the human (Age and Domain Experience).  The aim was to comprehend how these 
variables influence the way humans accumulate and integrate information about the 
reliability of an automated decision aid and how the use of this information affects their 
behavior.  This objective was accomplished by analyzing behavior as a function of 
different variables that affect the weight humans place on the support provided by an 
automated decision support aid.  
Another objective of this research was to evaluate age-related effects on the use of 
automation.  The effect of age on automation use is an area that has received little 
attention thus far.  Automated environments can provide a valuable medium for the study 
of aging and cognition.  Issues such as cautiousness, information accumulation and 
information integration are important aspects of reliance on automation as well as 
cognitive aging.  Clearly, understanding age-related differences in moderators and 
mediators of automation usage and trust are critical to theories and models of human-
automation interaction.  While there is some evidence that the nature of human-
automation interaction differs as a function of age (Kantowitz et al., 1997; McCarley et 
al., 2003; Sanchez et al., 2004), the factors that contribute to these age-related differences 
are still unclear.  
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In addition to investigating age-related effects, possible effects of domain 
experience were evaluated.  Two different populations were tested, Farmers and Non-
Farmers.  The Farmer group had experience operating agricultural vehicles.  The aim of 
evaluating population differences was to evaluate factors such as experience with a 
specific domain on the manipulated variables in the present study.  The automation was 
comprised of an automated collision avoidance system embedded within a multi-task 
environment.  The experimental environment was a simulated task familiar to Farmers 








 Two experiments, which included three different populations, were conducted.  
The first experiment was conducted in the Iowa/Illinois region and it involved the 
participation of younger adults with experience operating agricultural vehicles.  The 
objective of this experiment was to understand the effects of different error type on trust 
in and reliance on automation.  Participants in Experiment 2 were younger and older 
adults without experience operating agricultural vehicles.  This study involved the 
investigation of the effects of different distribution of errors on reliance and trust in the 
automation as well as the effects of error type.  In addition, age-related differences in the 
use of automation were investigated.  Both experiments used identical experimental 




Twenty younger adults (aged 19-29, M = 23.2, SD = 2.9, all males) with 
experience operating agricultural vehicles, which included tractors and harvesting 
combines, participated in this study.  A harvesting combine is a farm machine used to 
harvest different types of crops.  Combines are highly automated currently; hence, the 
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participants have experience with automation but not the particular automation used in 
this study.  Participants were recruited from the Iowa/Illinois regions and were given a 
John Deere hat for their participation.  General health information was collected before 
the study, and none of the participants reported conditions that would affect visual acuity.  
Basic ability data are provided in Appendix B as a function of the Error Type 
Manipulation.  The groups were very similar across all measures with the exception of 




 The manipulation in this study was the automation Error Type: False Alarms and 
Misses.  Each condition included 10 such errors (either 10 false alarms or 10 misses).  At 
the end of the session an opposite or exception error occurred (e.g., a false alarm in the 
Misses Condition).  The 10 similar errors were quasi-randomly distributed within the first 
57 minutes.  The exception error occurred at minute 58.  The distribution of the errors can 








The experiment utilized an IBM-compatible laptop computer (3.2 GHz, 512 MB 
RAM) with a 15.4” display.  The input device was an external, standard QWERTY 
keyboard, which was attached via USB port.  Except for the keys needed to interact with 
the simulator, all keys were removed.  The simulator was coded using Macromedia Flash 




The experimental simulator was comprised of two main tasks, a collision 
avoidance task and a tracking task.  The collision avoidance task was supported by an 
“imperfect” automated collision avoidance system and the tracking task was performed 
manually.  The total experiment lasted approximately two hours, half of which was spent 
on the experimental phase.    
The simulator was divided into three separate windows, the outside view, the 
collision avoidance window, and the tracking task window (Figure 3).  There were a total 
of six keys mapped onto specific functions in the system.  The up, down, left, and right 
arrow keys were used to perform the tracking task.  The spacebar was used to view the 
outside window and the enter key was used to avoid obstacles.  The system only allowed 
one key to function at a time.  For example, if the spacebar was held down, no other key 


















Figure 3. Screenshot of the simulator. Top window is the outside view, bottom left 




Collision Avoidance Task 
 
The top window represented the outside view from the perspective of an operator 
sitting in the cab of an agricultural vehicle.  Obstacles (deer) were visible in the outside 
view window.  The outside view remained hidden unless the spacebar was pressed and it 
remained visible until it was released.  The bottom left window contained the automated 
collision avoidance system.  Within this window, there was an automated collision 
avoidance indicator that indicated the presence of a deer by turning from white to red and 
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generating an “AVOID” warning.  For correct detections, the indicator turned red as soon 
as the deer appeared in the top window and remained red for 15 seconds.  During 
automation false alarms, the indicator also turned red for 15 seconds, but there was no 
deer in the top window.  For automation misses, a deer appeared in the top window for 15 
seconds, but the indicator did not turn red.  During periods of correct rejection by the 















Figure 4.  Immediate feedback about the outcome of actions in the collision avoidance 
task.  A “collision” could result from either not pressing the enter key within 15 seconds 
of the appearance of a deer or from pressing enter while the automation was generating a 
false alarm.  An “unnecessary maneuver” resulted from pressing enter in the absence of a 
deer and an alarm.  The “obstacle avoided” feedback appeared after pressing enter in the 




When a deer appeared in the top window, participants were responsible for 
pressing the enter key.  Participants were told that once enter was pressed, the vehicle 
would automatically steer around the deer, although there was no way to actually witness 
the action of steering around the deer because pressing enter meant that the spacebar had 
been released, which blocked the outside view.  No more than one deer ever appeared at 
once.  Deer did not always appear in the same location in the top window, although they 
always appeared within the middle 50% of the horizontal axis of the outside view 
window.   
The objective of the collision avoidance task was to complete as much of the task 
without losing any acres due to an “avoidance error.”  Any avoidance error resulted in the 
loss of one acre.  Participants received immediate feedback about all actions/inactions 
associated with the collision avoidance task (Figure 4).   
In addition to immediate feedback, participants also received cumulative feedback 
about their performance via the “acres lost to avoidance error” counter at the bottom of 
the lower left window (Figure 3).  Any time an error was made, an acre was added in this 
counter.  Avoidance errors occurred as a result of the following actions/inactions: 
1. Failing to press enter within 15 seconds of the appearance of a deer.  This scenario 
could result from either ignoring a true alarm or failing to detect a deer during a miss 
by the collision avoidance system.1  The immediate feedback as a result of failing to 
press enter within 15 seconds of the appearance of a deer was “COLLISION” (See 
Figure 4).  
                                                 
1 A collision could also result from the participant not detecting a deer even if they viewed the outside 
window.  This scenario only appeared to have occurred twice (two participants, once each) throughout the 
entire investigation (Experiments 1 and 2).   
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2. Pressing enter during a false alarm by the automation.  The immediate feedback for 
this action was “COLLISION” (See Figure 4).  Participants were told that false 
alarms were generated when the collision avoidance system detected an obstacle that 
was not in its direct path but the automation perceived it to be in its direct path.  
Therefore, pressing enter during a false alarm resulted in a collision because the 
vehicle unnecessarily steered away from its path into the obstacle that caused the 
false alarm.  Consequently, failing to press enter during a miss by the automation and 
pressing enter during a false alarm both resulted in a collision.  Equating the 
consequences of both Error Types was done in an effort to remove any biases 
associated with the occurrence of each Error Type.   
3. Pressing enter during a correct rejection by the automation.  If the vehicle was 
directed off-path unnecessarily (no deer present) and no alarm from the collision 
avoidance system, a message saying “UNNECESARY MANUEVER, 1 ACRE 
LOST” appeared (See Figure 4).  This penalty was implemented to prevent 
participants from randomly pressing enter in the absence of alarms.     
If participants pressed enter within 15 seconds of when a deer appeared, a message 
saying “OBSTACLE AVOIDED” was displayed (See Figure 4).  All three feedback 
messages appeared over the top window and remained visible for 15 seconds, irrespective 




Reliability of the Collision Avoidance System  
 
Within the 60 minutes of the experimental session there were a total of 240 
events.  Events lasted 15 seconds each and were comprised of correct detections, correct 
rejections, false alarms, and misses by the automation.  The reason for choosing 15 
seconds as the length of an event was because each alarm (true and false) lasted 15 
seconds and also when deer appeared, they remained visible for 15 seconds.   
The overall reliability of the automation, which was calculated by dividing 11 
automation errors over 240 total events, was 95.4%.  Of the 240 events, 179 were correct 
rejections, 50 were correct detections, 10 were either false alarms or misses, and 1 was 
either a false alarm or a miss.  In the False Alarms Condition, the false alarm rate of the 
automation was 5.3% and the miss rate was 1.97%.  In the Misses Condition, the false 
alarm rate of the automation was 0.56% and the miss rate was 16.7%.  This mismatch in 
false alarm and miss rate exists because of the mismatch in the number of correct 
rejections (179) and correct detections (50) events.  However, the number of errors in 





The tracking task was located in the bottom right window (See Figure 1).  The 
objective of this task was to prevent the filled square from reaching the edge of the box.  
Any time the filled square overlapped with any of the dashed lines, it changed from green 
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to red.  The square was controlled with the up, down, left, or right keys.  The square 
randomly deviated from the center in four directions (up, down, left, right), but never in 
more than one direction at a time.  The time it took for the square to go from the center to 
the edge ranged from 1200 ms to1400 ms.  Once the vehicle began to deviate from the 
center, its speed was constant.  Upon movement of the square in a specific direction (e.g., 
up), the key pointing to the opposite direction (e.g., down) needed to be pressed once to 
return it to the center position.  Once the square returned to the center position a random 
amount of time ranging from 1 to 2 seconds elapsed before it began moving again.  
Participants were told that for every 15 seconds that the square overlapped with the 
dashed lines they would lose an acre due to a “tracking error”.  The 15 seconds that it 
took to lose an acre were accrued cumulatively.  For example, if the square was allowed 
to reach the edge five times and each time it remained red for three seconds, this resulted 
in the loss of an acre.  Cumulative performance feedback for this task was provided by 




Participants were asked to complete a demographics form and perform four 
abilities tests including Paper Folding (Ekstrom, French, Harman & Dermen, 1976) 
Shipley Vocabulary (Shipley, 1986), Digit Symbol Substitution (Wechsler, 1981), and 
Reverse Digit Span (Wechsler, 1981).  Next, participants received an explanation of the 
task and were provided with training.  The explanation of the task and the training for 
both experimental conditions (False Alarms and Misses) was identical.   
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During training, participants were first exposed to the tracking task for three 
minutes.  The objective during the three minutes of training was to keep the square within 
the dashed lines.  Training on the tracking task continued after three minutes until 
criterion was reached.  Criterion for this task consisted of being able to keep the vehicle 
inside the dashed lines during the last minute of the training session.2   
Next, participants received a thorough explanation of the collision avoidance task.  
Participants were told the collision avoidance system was “very reliable, but not perfect.”  
Screen shots of the four different states of the system (correct detections, correct 
rejections, false alarms, and misses) were presented and the consequences of pressing or 
not pressing enter for each scenario were reviewed in detail.  Participants were allowed to 
ask any questions that would help them better understand the task.  However, the 
standard response to questions that could potentially bias participants’ perception of the 
automation such as “how often will the automation be wrong?” or “which type of error is 
it more likely to generate?” was “I’m not sure of that, all I know is the automation is very 
reliable, but it’s not perfect.”   
Participants received training on the collision avoidance task for five minutes 
(without the tracking task).  During the training session, the automation correctly detected 
eight objects, missed one, and generated one false alarm.  Following training for the 
collision avoidance task, another five minute training session was conducted with both 
tasks (tracking and collision avoidance).  Participants were given a short break upon 
completion of the training session.     
 The experimental phase lasted 60 minutes.  Participants were asked to complete 
the entire session without taking a break.  However, they were told that if they really 
                                                 
2 All participants in the investigation reached criterion within the first three minutes 
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needed to take a break they could.  All participants completed the experimental phase 
without requesting a break.  Upon completion of the experimental phase, a subjective 
trust questionnaire was administered (Appendix D).  Lastly, participants were debriefed 




Collision Avoidance Task   
 
All of the actions (key presses) associated with this task were recorded and time-
stamped.  Performance measures included the following: 
1. Number of times the outside was viewed (spacebar presses): the spacebar presses 
measure accounted for every press of the spacebar, which included instances in which 
participants chose to “double check” the outside window more than once within a few 
seconds.  For example, in the presence of a single alarm, a participant might have 
pressed the spacebar three or four times within the span of 3 seconds.  This behavior 
was likely a product of not being entirely sure that a deer had been detected.  
Therefore, second, third, and fourth presses of the spacebar, within the span of a few 
seconds were not as pure indicators of non-reliance as the first press.   
2. Number of times the outside was viewed (first spacebar presses): this measure 
consisted of the first spacebar press made in every 15 second event.  This measure of 
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reliance was the primary one used for the subsequent analyses.  The maximum 
number of first spacebar presses per participant was 240.  
3. Number of spacebar presses during alarms: this measure included the first spacebar 
press made in every 15 second event during alarms.   
4. Number of spacebar presses during non-alarms: this measure included the first 
spacebar presses during periods when the collision avoidance system was idle (non-
alarms).  Along with spacebar presses during alarms, this measure made up the first 
spacebar presses measure (#2).   
5. Total time the spacebar was pressed. 
6. Total number of errors in the collision avoidance task, which included: 
o False positives as a result of an automation false alarm (collision).  
o False positives as a result of pressing enter in the absence of an alarm and a 
deer (unnecessary maneuver).  
o False negatives as a result of the absence of an alarm during a miss by the 
automation (collision).  
o False negatives as a result of ignoring a true alarm (collision). 
7. False positive rate: the number of times that a participant pressed enter in the absence 
of a deer divided by the total number of bins when deer were absent 
8. False negative rate: the number of times a participant failed to press enter in the 
presence of a deer divided by the number of deer that were present. 
9. Subjective trust (assessed at the end of the experimental session; Appendix D). 




Tracking Task   
 
Performance measures for the tracking task included the following:  
1. Total number of acres lost due to tracking error: this measure consisted of the total 
amount of time that the square was red (at the edge of the box) divided by 15.  This 
measure was consistent with the instructions provided to participants regarding ways 
in which points would be lost.   




The results of previous studies have shown that the prevalence of false alarms, 
relative to misses, appears to lead to greater decrements in trust and reliance (Johnson, 
2004).  Some have suggested that the greater impact of false alarms on trust is a product 
of the saliency associated with this type of error.  Others have suggested that misses 
actually have a greater impact on trust and reliance because they often have more serious 
consequences associated with them.  Given that the cost of failing to detect both types of 
automation errors was equal in the current experiment, it was expected that the False 
Alarms Condition would lead to lower levels of subjective trust and perceived reliability 
of the automation.   
The results of several studies (Cotte et al., 2000; Dixon & Wickens, 2003; 2004; 
Gupta et al., 2001; Lehto et al., 2000) provide some evidence that human behavior is 
affected differently as a function of the prevalence of a specific type of error by the 
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automation.  Therefore, it was expected that during periods when the collision avoidance 
system is idle (non-alarms), participants who are in Misses Condition would view the 
outside window more frequently than those in the False Alarms Condition.  Conversely, 
participants in the False Alarms Condition were expected to view the outside more 
frequently during periods when the alarm is active (red).  This prediction was based on 
the assumption that humans will adjust their behavior according to the characteristics of 
the automation in an effort to reduce the amount of time and effort they have to use in 
verifying the automation while trying to achieve a high level of performance in both 
tasks. 
Because the simulation used for the experiment is a dual-task environment, it was 
expected that performance on the tracking task would be inversely related to the level of 
non-reliance on the automation.  This prediction was based on previous evidence, which 
suggests that unreliable automation can have a negative impact on the performance of 
concurrent tasks (Dixon & Wickens, 2003; Sanchez et al., 2004).  Low automation 
reliability usually leads to low levels of reliance on the automation.  Not relying on the 
automation means that more cognitive and physical resources are allocated to the 









Two groups of participants completed this study.  Sixty younger adults (aged 18-
24, M = 19.5, SD = 1.6) and sixty-one older adults (aged 65-75, M = 69.7, SD = 3.5).  
One older adult was excluded from the analysis because this participant dozed off during 
the experiment.  The analyses were performed with the remaining sixty older adults (aged 
65-75, M = 69.6, SD = 3.5). The younger adults were recruited from introductory 
psychology courses at the Georgia Institute of Technology and were given course credit 
for their voluntary participation.  The older adults were paid $25 for two hours of 
participation and were recruited from the Atlanta metropolitan area.  Older adults were 
screened over the phone for good health and for any disease or condition that would 
affect their vision.  All participants’ general health information was also collected before 
the study.   
General participant characteristics by Age, Error Type and Distribution of Errors 
can be found in Tables E1, E2, and E3 (Appendix E).  Younger Adults performed 
significantly better than Older Adults in the Digit Symbol Substitution and Reverse Digit 
Span tests while Older Adults outperformed Younger Adults in the Shipley Vocabulary 






Experiment 2 was a 2 (Age: Younger Adults and Older Adults) x 2 (Error Type: 
False Alarms and Misses) x 3 (Distribution of Errors: Throughout, First Half, and Second 
Half) fully factorial design.  All the variables were manipulated between-subjects; 
therefore, there were a total of 10 participants per experimental group.   
The main experimental design difference between Experiment 1 and Experiment 
2 was the addition of the Distribution of Errors manipulation.  As in Experiment 1, every 
group was exposed to 11 automation errors (10 similar errors and one exception error).  
The exception error occurred after all the similar errors had occurred.  Within the 
Throughout Condition, errors were distributed in the same order as in Experiment 1 (the 
10 similar errors were distributed quasi-randomly within the first 57 minutes and the 
exception error occurred at minute 58).  Within the First Half Condition, the 10 similar 
errors were quasi-randomly distributed within the first 27 minutes of the task and the 
exception error occurred at minute 28.  Within the Second Half Condition, the 10 similar 
errors were quasi-randomly distributed between minute 30 and minute 57, and the 
exception error occurred at minute 58.  The distribution of errors during the first 30 
minutes of the First Half Condition was identical to the distribution of errors during the 
last 30 minutes of the Second Half Condition (See Appendix B for the distribution of the 








The experiment utilized IBM-compatible computers (3.2 GHz, 4.1 GB RAM) 
connected to 19 inch cathode-ray tube displays.  Refresh rate was set at 85 Hz.  The input 
device was a standard QWERTY keyboard.  The experimental simulator was identical to 








 The experimental procedure was identical to the procedure followed in 










It was expected that a higher concentration of errors in the second half of the 
experiment would have a stronger negative impact on trust ratings and perceived 
reliability estimates of the automation than a concentration of errors in the first half of the 
experiment.  Therefore, participants in the First Half Condition should have higher trust 
ratings and estimates of the automation’s reliability than participants in the Second Half 
Condition.  This pattern of results will not only provide evidence that the location of 
errors in time is an important component of reliability, but it will also suggest that the 
closer errors occur to the time when humans are asked to provide an estimate of the 
reliability, the lower estimates are likely to be.    
Reliance patterns as a function of Error Type were expected to be similar to the 
patterns observed in Experiment 1.  Participants in the False Alarms Condition were 
expected to view the outside window more frequently during alarms than participants in 
the Misses Condition.  Conversely, during non-alarms it was expected that participants in 
the Misses Condition would exhibit less reliance on the automation than participants in 
the False Alarms Condition.  Because participants were expected to develop different 
patterns of reliance as a function of Error Type, it was expected that the detection rate of 
the exception error (e.g., the miss in the mostly False Alarms Condition) would be less 
than the detection rate of the rest of the errors.   
The results of previous research suggest that the negative impact of unreliable 
events is greater for older adults than for younger adults (Sanchez et al., 2004).  
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However, given that the reliability of the automation used in this investigation was rather 
high, it was expected that older adults will benefit more from automated support and their 
estimates of reliability will likely be higher than the estimates of younger adults.  Age-
related differences in tracking and obstacle detection performance favoring the younger 
adults were also expected.   
The negative effects of an error were expected to decrease as time passed and 
participants were exposed to more errors.  To test this hypothesis, reliance on the 
automation before and after errors was compared.  It was expected, for example, that the 
increase in monitoring of the outside view from before the first error to after it will be 
greater than the increase in monitoring of the outside view from before the sixth error to 
after it.  If humans perceive errors as “common” occurrences in the system, they should 
adjust their behavior accordingly.   
A comparison will be made between participants in Experiment 1 and the 
Younger Adults in the Throughout Condition from Experiment 2.  This comparison will 
shed light on the possible effects of domain experience on human-automation interaction.  
It is expected that errors will have a greater effect on the trust and reliance of the 
participants in Experiment 1 (Farmers).  Because of their experience with agricultural 
vehicles and highly reliable automation, the Farmer group may be less willing to accept 






Overview of Analyses 
 
The results of this investigation were analyzed at both the micro- and macro-
levels.  The macro-level approach consisted of analyses of variance (ANOVA) to make 
comparisons across all experimental conditions.  A correlation analysis was also 
performed to identify any meaningful relationships between the variables of interest.  The 
complete set of results for the ANOVAs and correlations can be found in Appendices F 
and G respectively.  
The micro-level analyses were geared toward examining and understanding how 
human behavior, specifically reliance on the automation, changed as a function of time 
and the variables of interest.  In this analysis, the measures “first spacebar presses during 
alarms” and “first spacebar presses during non-alarms” were plotted across the entire 
experimental session, which encompassed 240 bins of 15 seconds each.   
The results from Experiments 1 and 2 were organized in the following order:  
1. The results of Experiment 2 were presented first; beginning with a macro-level 
analysis of the effects of Age, Error Type, and Distribution of Errors on reliance, trust 
and perceived reliability. 
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2. Next, a micro-level analysis of the reliance data for the Younger Adults provided a 
closer look at the development of reliance across time as a function of Error Type and 
Distribution of Errors. 
3. A micro-level analysis of the reliance data for the Older Adults facilitated a closer 
examination of age-related differences in the development of reliance as a function of 
Error Type and Distribution of Errors.    
4. The effects of Agricultural (domain) Experience on reliance and trust were presented 
at both the macro and micro levels (Experiment 1 versus Younger Adults in 
Experiment 2).   
5. Lastly, the effects of Age, Error Type, and Distribution of Errors on the following 
measures were presented: 
a. Detection of the exception error 
b. Effects of first and subsequent failures on reliance 
c. Tracking task performance 
i. Number of acres lost to tracking error 
ii. Number of red events 
d. Obstacle detection performance 
i. Number of acres lost to collision errors 




Summary of Results 
 
 Table 1 contains a summarized version of the results from Experiments 1 and 2.  
The effects of the experimental manipulations on the main dependent measures are listed.  
 











a) OA relied less on 
automated alarms  
 
b) OA took longer to 
adjust their reliance 
behavior as a 
function of Error 
Type 
 
a) During alarms, FA 




b) during non-alarms, 
FA increased reliance 




condition led to less 
overall reliance  
 
b) higher concentration 
of errors did not lead to 
faster development of 
reliance patterns as a 
function of Error Type 
Farmers 






OA reported higher 
trust ratings* 
FA led to higher trust 
ratings Misses 
Recency of errors led to 









Recency of errors led to 






YA had higher 
performance* 
FA led to higher 





YA had higher 
performance* 
FA led to higher 
performance No effect No effect 
Note. * represents expected result 





Reliance and Trust in Automation: A Macro-Level Analysis (Experiment 2) 
 
First Spacebar Presses   
 
The main measure of non-reliance in this investigation was the first spacebar 
press per event.  Therefore, because there were a total of 240 events, the maximum 
number of first spacebar presses per participant was 240.  The results of the total number 
of spacebar presses can be found in Appendix F.  It is worth noting that there was a 
strong relationship between total spacebar presses and first spacebar presses, r(120) = 










Figure 5. Non-reliance (first spacebar presses) by Error Type for all participants in 
Experiment 2. The maximum number of spacebar presses per participant was 240.  Error 
bars represent the standard error of the mean. 
 
For first spacebar presses, there was a main effect of Error Type where 


















Alarms Condition, F(1, 108) = 9.70, η2 = .08, p < .05 (Figure 5).  Given the nature of the 
system used in this study, this finding was not surprising.  In the Misses Condition, 
participants had to constantly check the outside view in an attempt to “catch” misses by 
the automation.  This state of the system, when the collision avoidance system was 
inactive, consisted of approximately 75% of the total time in the experiment.  However, 
in the False Alarms Condition, participants only had to double check the output of the 
automation when it generated an alarm, which consisted of approximately 25% of the 
total experiment time.   
There was also a main effect of Distribution of Errors on first spacebar presses, 
F(2, 108) = 3.74, η2 = .07, p < .05.  A Tukey Post Hoc analysis revealed that participants 
in the Throughout Condition relied less on the automation than those in the First Half 
Condition.  It is worth noting that there was a significant interaction between Error Type 
and Distribution of Errors, F(2, 108) = 10.98, η2 = .17, p < .05 on first spacebar presses. 
 
Spacebar Presses during Alarms and Non-Alarms 
 
In an effort to determine if the experimental manipulations had an effect on 
reliance during different states of the automation, the first spacebar presses data were 
divided into periods when the collision avoidance alarm was active (alarms) and periods 
when it was inactive (non-alarms).  In contrast to the results obtained for the first 
spacebar press, during periods when the collision avoidance system was active (alarms), 
participants in the False Alarms Condition relied less on the automation than those in the 
Misses Condition, F(1, 108) = 52.4, η2 = .33, p < .05 (Figure 6).  However, during periods 
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when the collision avoidance system was inactive (non-alarms), participants in the Misses 
Condition relied less on the automation than participants in the False Alarms condition, 
F(1, 108) = 22.5, η2 = .17, p < .05 (Figure 7).   
Interestingly, there was a main effect of Age for spacebar presses during alarms, 
where Older Adults relied less on the automation than Younger Adults, F(1, 108) = 10.6, 
η2 = .09, p < .05.  However, there was not a main effect of Age for spacebar presses 
during non-alarm periods.  This finding suggests that older adults are less likely than 
younger adults to rely on automation when it is actively providing support in the form of 
an alarm.  However, older adults are just as willing to rely on the automation during 











Figure 6. Non-reliance (first spacebar presses during alarms) by Error Type for all 
participants in Experiment 2. The maximum number of spacebar presses during alarms 




















The contrast in reliance behavior as a function of Error Type during different 
system states brings to light the complex relationship between automation reliability and 
reliance on the automation.  While the prevalence of each type of error can increase 
reliance on the automation during a specific system state, it has the opposite effect on the 
other state.  For example, participants who were used to an automated system with a 
looser detection criterion (False Alarms Condition) relied less on the automation during 
alarms than those in the Misses Condition, but were more reliant on it during non-alarm 
periods.  This effect was explored in more detail in the following section in which 










Figure 7. Non-reliance (first spacebar presses during non-alarms) by Error Type. The 
maximum number of spacebar presses during non-alarms was 180.  Error bars represent 























Total Time for Spacebar Presses 
 
 The pattern of results for the total time that the spacebar was pressed was similar 
to the pattern of results for first spacebar presses.  There was a significant interaction 
between Error Type and Distribution of Errors, F(2, 108) = 11.5, η2 = .18, p < .05 (Figure 
8).  There were also main effects of Age, F(1, 108) = 11.0, η2 = .09, p < .05; Error Type, 
F(1, 108) = 15.0, η2 = .12, p < .05; and Distribution of Errors, F(2, 108) = 4.4 η2 = .08, p 
< .05.  The average amount of time that spacebars were pressed across all participants 
was 870 ms (SD = 340ms).  The short amount of time per spacebar press was not 










Figure 8. Total amount of time the spacebar was pressed by Error Type and Distribution 


































Subjective Trust   
 
As expected, trust ratings were negatively correlated to the measures of non-
reliance (See Appendix G for correlations table).  These correlations provide more 
evidence suggesting a strong relationship between trust in and reliance on the automation.  
The analysis on the trust data showed that False Alarms led to higher trust ratings than 
Misses, F(1, 108) = 15.2, η2 = .12, p < .05.  This finding was consistent with previous 
studies that have found that misses lead to lower levels of trust relative to false alarms 
(Dixon & Wickens, 2003), but inconsistent with the results of other studies that have 
found the opposite (Gupta et al., 2001; Johnson, 2004).   
There was a main effect of Distribution of Errors, F(2, 108) = 22.6, η2 = .30, p < 
.05.  A Post Hoc Tukey analysis showed that both the Throughout and First Half 
Conditions led to higher trust ratings than the Second Half Condition (both p’s < 0.05).  
Given that in all three conditions the total number of errors was the same, this finding 
provides some evidence for the degrading effects of recency of errors on trust.  This 
finding was explored in greater detail with the micro-level analyses following this 
section.  
There was a significant interaction between Age and Distribution of Errors, F(2, 
108) = 3.4, η2 = .06, p < .05.  Older Adults reported higher trust ratings than Younger 
Adults within the Throughout and First Half Conditions but not within the Second Half 
Condition (Figure 9).  This interaction suggests that older adults were more likely to base 
their trust ratings of the automation on their most recent interaction with it.  Furthermore, 
there was a main effect of Age, F(1, 108) = 18.0, η2 = .14, p < .05, where Older Adults 
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reported higher trust ratings than Younger Adults.  The main effect of Age provides 
support to the idea that if the level of reliability of the automation is high enough to make 
it useful, then the benefit of the automation to older adults, relative to younger adults, is 










Figure 9. Subjective trust ratings by Age and Distribution of Errors. Error bars represent 





The pattern of results for the perceived reliability measure was consistent with the 
pattern observed for the trust ratings.  Although there was a main effect of Age, where 
Older Adults reported higher reliability estimates than Younger Adults, F(1, 108) = 4.6, 
η2 = .04, p < .05, there was also a significant interaction between Age and Distribution of 






















estimates than Younger Adults within the Throughout and First Half Conditions, but not 
within the Second Half Condition (Figure 10).  Interestingly, within the Younger Adult 
group there were no differences in perceived reliability as a function of the Distribution 
of Errors.  However, within the Older Adult group, reliability estimates were significantly 
lower in the Second Half Condition than in the Throughout and First Half Conditions.3  
These results suggest that when evaluating the reliability of the automation, older adults 
are more heavily influenced by their most recent experience with it.  There was also a 
main effect of Distribution of Errors, F(2, 108) = 9.7, η2 = .15, p < .05.  A Post Hoc 
Tukey analysis showed that both the Throughout and First Half Conditions led to higher 
reliability estimates than the Second Half Condition (both p’s < 0.05).  These results 
provide more evidence for a recency effect in estimating the reliability of the automation. 
Another explanation for the effect of the Distribution of Errors on reliability 
estimates is that participants in the Second Half Condition had built up their expectations 
of the automation during the first 30 minutes and the sudden appearance of errors during 
the second half led to lower estimates of reliability.  There is some evidence that humans 
have high expectations about the reliability of automated systems (Crocoll & Coury, 
1990; Dijkstra, Liebrand & Timminga, 1998; Dzindolet, Pierce, Beck, Dawe & 
Anderson, 2001).  Therefore, a sudden change from perfect reliability to imperfect could 
have a considerable impact in humans’ perception of it.  A mismatch between expected 
and actual reliability could also be a reason for the underestimation of reliability by most 
participants (See Figure 10).  This underestimation of reliability was consistent with the 
                                                 
3 Even though the pattern of results of the subjective trust ratings and perceived reliability measures were 
similar, and there was a strong correlation between the two measures, r(120)= .54, p < .01, the pattern of 
results were not exactly the same.  Specifically, the trust ratings of Younger Adults differed as a function of 
Distribution of Errors, but this was not the case for estimates of reliability.  This difference suggests that 
trust ratings and perceived reliability measure different components of the construct of trust. 
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results of previous studies (e.g., Dixon & Wickens, 2003; Johnson, 2004; Moray et al., 










Figure 10. Perceived reliability ratings by age and Distribution of Errors.  The dashed 
line indicates the actual reliability of the automation, which was 95.4%.  Error bars 
represent the standard error of the mean. 
 
 
The Effects of Error and Distribution of Errors on Reliance: A Micro-Level 
Analysis 
  
The results from the macro-level analysis showed that differences in reliance as a 
function of Error Type were dependent on the state of the system.  The focus of this 
section was to explore in greater detail how behavior changes over time and as a function 






































Experiment 2 are presented and discussed. The reliance data of the Older Adults are 
presented in the following section.  
 Figures 11 - 22 illustrate the changes in the percentage of participants who relied 
on the automation over the entire experiment as a function of Error Type and the state of 
the automation (alarm and non-alarm periods).  A best fit regression line was plotted for 
each Error Type Condition during the first 30 minutes (bins 0 – 120) and during the last 
30 minutes (bins 120 – 240) of the experiment.  The y-axes in Figures 11 – 22 represent 
the percentage of participants who pressed the spacebar across each of the 240 time bins 
(x-axes).  In the figures that illustrate the number of participants who pressed the 
spacebar during alarms there are a total of 50 bins in which data points are plotted (50 
points for each False Alarms and Misses).4  In the figures that illustrate the number of 
participants who pressed the spacebar during non-alarms there are a total of 180 bins in 
which data points are plotted (False Alarms and Misses).   
Because there were 10 participants in each experimental group, a value of 100% 
on the y-axes means that 10 of 10 participants pressed the spacebar during a specific time 
bin.  The Non-Parametric Kruskal-Wallis test was used to analyze the effects of Error 
Type on the percentage of participants who relied on the automation during alarms and 
non-alarms.  These analyses were performed for both the first and the last 30 minutes of 
the experiment.  
   
                                                 
4 Only correct detections (true alarms) are plotted.  False alarms are omitted because the corresponding 
errors were misses, and the objective of this analysis was to compare behavior as a function of Error Type 





Figure 11 illustrates the percentage of younger adults who pressed the spacebar 
during alarms and Figure 12 during non-alarms.  Both figures illustrate data from the 
condition in which all of the automation errors were distributed throughout the 
experiment.  As expected, reliance on the automation differed as a function of Error Type 
and the state of the automation.  During alarms (Figure 11), participants in both the False 
Alarms and Misses Conditions had similar levels of non-reliance for the first 30 minutes 
of the experiment, χ2 = 2.17, η2 = .04, p > .05.  However, during the last 30 minutes, 
distinct patterns of behavior emerged.  Participants in the Misses Condition began to rely 
more on the automation than participants in the False Alarms Condition, χ2 = 30.16, η2 = 
.62, p < .05.  This difference suggests that after approximately 30 minutes, most 
participants in the Misses Condition began to adjust their behavior in accordance to the 
criterion of the automation.  Participants in the Misses Condition realized that it was not 
necessary to frequently check the validity of the alarms by pressing the spacebar and 
viewing the outside window because the errors by the automation up to that point had 
consisted of only misses and automated alarms up to that point had been perfectly 
reliable.  However, most participants in the False Alarms Condition continued to 
frequently press the spacebar during alarms.  These results suggest that the criterion of an 
automated system can have an important impact on the psychological meaning of an 
alarm.   
The percentage of younger adults who pressed the spacebar during non-alarms is 
illustrated in Figure 12.  The pattern of behavior as a function of Error Type observed 
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during non-alarms was the opposite of the behavior observed during alarms.  
Interestingly, the different patterns of behavior as a function of Error Type emerged 
during the first 30 minutes of the experiment, χ2 = 19.25, η2 = .11, p < .05, and remained 
stable during the last 30 minutes, χ2 = 1108.08, η2 = .60, p < .05.  The majority of 
participants in the Misses Condition continued to press the spacebar throughout the 
experiment while most participants in the False Alarms Condition had adjusted their 
behavior toward the end of the first 30 minutes to better match the criterion of the 
automation. 
 
     








Figure 11. Percentage of participants who pressed the spacebar (y-axis) across each 15 
second time bin (x-axis) as a function of Error Type.  Each point represents the 
percentage of Younger Adults who pressed the spacebar during alarms in the 
Throughout Condition.  [(Y-intercept and slope) x 10].  
 
 



































R ² = 0.31
Y = 7.67
Slope = 0.005
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The earlier emergence of different patterns of reliance during non-alarm periods 
relative to alarm periods suggests a clear difference in the manner in which humans 
interact with a system as a function of the state of the automation.  Even though the 
automation is providing support while it is idle (during non-alarms) by letting the human 
know that there are no obstacles, an alarm is a more salient way for an automated system 
to provide support.  The salience of alarms relative to non-alarms is a feasible 
explanation for the delayed shift in behavior toward reliance on alarms by participants in 
the Misses Condition (See Figure 11).  Because non-alarms are less salient, participants 
in the False Alarm Condition were more inclined to begin to rely on the automation 











Figure 12. Percentage of participants who pressed the spacebar (y-axis) across each 15 
second time bin (x-axis) as a function of Error Type.  Each point represents the 
percentage of Younger Adults who pressed the spacebar during non-alarms in the 
Throughout Condition.  [(Y-intercept and slope) x 10]. 
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Another interesting outcome of this analysis was that in three of the four sets of 
regression lines in Figures 11 and 12, the R² values for the False Alarms regression lines 
were higher than the R² values for the Misses regression lines.  The fact that most of the 
False Alarms lines have a better fit suggests that the reliance behavior across participants 
in that condition was less variable than the behavior of the participants in the Misses 
Condition.  The implication of this trend is that the emergence of reliance behavior by 
humans who interact with a system in which false alarms are prevalent is more 
predictable relative to a system in which misses are more common.   
The pattern of behavior illustrated in Figures 11 and 12 provides an important 
insight into the relationship between automation reliability and human behavior.  To date, 
the goal of various research efforts has been to understand how different levels of 
reliability affect trust-related behaviors, such as reliance (e.g., Moray et al., 2000; 
Parasuraman et al., 1993; Sanchez et al., 2004; Wiegmann et al., 2001).  The results of 
the current investigation show that reliance on automation is not simply shaped by the 
automation’s reliability (the percentage of errors it makes), but also by its characteristics, 
specifically the prevalence of each error type.  These results imply that in a system in 
which most errors consist of false alarms, one could argue that reliance on the automation 
is likely to be high, as long as the automation is idle.  Conversely, when the automation is 
providing support information in the form of an alarm, reliance on the automation is 
likely to be low.  This contrast in behavior, which is dependent on the state of the system, 
highlights the complexity of the construct of trust in automation and has important 
theoretical and practical implications.       
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From a theoretical standpoint, it is clear that changes in human behavior as a 
result of automation errors are not random.  Instead, changes in behavior appear to be 
systematic responses to the characteristics of the automation in an effort to more 
effectively collaborate with it.  The prevalence of each type of error by the automation 
also has important effects on the allocation of attention by the human.   
From a practical standpoint, the current results suggest that it is critical to set 
realistic expectations when defining the role of a human in any system that requires 
collaboration with automation.  For example, the prevalence of each type of error can 
have different effects on the workload of the human.  In a system in which false alarms 
are prevalent, workload will likely be higher during alarm periods because the human has 
to constantly check the validity of the alarms.  Therefore, the human should not be 
expected to attend to many other stimuli during alarms.          
 
First Half Condition  
 
Figure 13 illustrates the percentage of Younger Adults who relied on the 
automation during alarm periods and Figure 14 during non-alarm periods.  Both Figures 
illustrate data from the condition in which all of the automation errors were distributed 
within the first half of the experiment.  Interestingly, the pattern of data illustrated in 
Figure 13 closely resembles the pattern in Figure 11 (Throughout Condition).  During 
alarms, most participants in both the False Alarms and Misses Conditions did not rely on 
the automation during the first 30 minutes of the experiment, χ2 = .70, η2 = .01, p > .05.  
However, during the last 30 minutes, more participants in the Misses Condition began to 
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rely on the automated alarms than in the False Alarms Condition, χ2 = 14.76, η2 = .30, p < 
.05.  Because of the greater concentration of errors by the automation during the first half 
of the experiment, it was expected that the distinct patterns of behavior as a function of 
Error Type would have emerged earlier than in the condition in which the errors were 
distributed throughout the experiment.  Instead, the different patterns did not emerge until 











Figure 13. Percentage of participants who pressed the spacebar (y-axis) across each 15 
second time bin (x-axis) as a function of Error Type.  Each point represents the 
percentage of Younger Adults who pressed the spacebar during alarms in the First Half 
Condition. [(Y-intercept and slope) x 10]. 
 
 
The results illustrated in Figure 13 suggest that a greater concentration of 
automation errors, at least to the degree in which it was changed with the Distribution of 
Errors manipulation, does not significantly impact the effects that error types have on the 
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reliance behavior during alarms.  The emergence of different patterns of behavior during 
the last 30 minutes of the experiment as a function of Error Type does suggest that once 
humans alter their behavior to better match the characteristics of the automation there is a 











Figure 14. Percentage of participants who pressed the spacebar (y-axis) across each 15 
second time bin (x-axis) as a function of Error Type.  Each point represents the 
percentage of Younger Adults who pressed the spacebar during non-alarms in the First 
Half Condition. [(Y-intercept and slope) x 10].  
 
Surprisingly, the pattern of behavior of the participants in the False Alarms 
Condition during the last 30 minutes of the experiment (Figure 13) does not suggest a 
strong trend toward reliance on the automation.  The results of previous studies show that 
humans are likely to begin to trust and rely on automation shortly after an error occurs 
(Lee & Moray, 1992; Riley 1996).  However, the current results suggest this tendency 
toward reliance is not evident when humans have learned through experience that the 
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automation has a tendency to generate false alarms and are faced with the decision to rely 
or not rely on automated alarms.  
Figure 14 illustrates the reliance data for non-alarm periods.  The pattern of data 
observed in the first 30 minutes of Figure 14 resembles the pattern observed in the first 
30 minutes of Figure 12, which was the Throughout Condition.  During the first 30 
minutes, more participants in the False Alarms Condition began to rely on the automation 
than in the Misses Condition, χ2 = 98.87, η2 = .56, p < .05.  The similarity between the 
trends observed in figures 12 and 14 suggests that the concentration of errors did not 
affect the rate at which reliance changed as a function of Error Type during non-alarms.  
However, during the last 30 minutes, when the automation was perfect, the negative slope 
of the best fit line for the Misses Condition indicates a trend toward the recovery of trust 
in the automation, manifested through reliance (Figure 14).  This trend toward reliance by 
participants in the Misses Condition provides some evidence that when transitioning from 
unreliable to perfect automation, the recovery of trust is more likely to be observed first 
in the reliance behavior during non-alarms and by those who are interacting with a 
system laden with misses.  Even with the trend toward reliance by participants in the 
Misses group during the last 30 minutes, the different patterns of reliance remained 
different as a function of Error Type, χ2 = 109.71, η2 = .61, p < .05.    
 
Second Half Condition 
 
Figure 15 illustrates the percentage of younger adults who relied on the 
automation during alarm periods and Figure 16 during non-alarm periods.  Both Figures 
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illustrate data from the condition in which all of the automation errors were distributed 
within the last 30 minutes of the experiment (Second Half Condition).  The first 30 
minutes graphed in Figures 15 and 16 provide an illustration of how reliance changes 
across time with perfect automation.  As expected, the negative slopes of all four lines in 
Figures 15 and 16 indicate an increase in the percentage of participants who relied on the 
automation across time.  It is worth noting that while Error Type did not have a 
significant effect on the percentage of participants who relied on alarms during the first 
30 minutes, more participants in the False Alarms Condition pressed the spacebar during 
the first 30 minutes during non-alarms, χ2 = 20.54, η2 = .12, p < .05.  This difference as a 
function of Error Type was not expected during the first 30 minutes, when the automation 











Figure 15. Percentage of participants who pressed the spacebar (y-axis) across each 15 
second time bin (x-axis) as a function of Error Type.  Each point represents the 
percentage of Younger Adults who pressed the spacebar during alarms in the Second 
Half Condition. [(Y-intercept and slope) x 10]. 
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  Interestingly, during the first 30 minutes there was a noticeable difference in 
behavior as a function of the state of the automation.  The trend toward reliance on the 
automation was greater during non-alarms than during alarms.  The evidence for this 
trend is in the steeper slopes of the regression lines during non-alarms (-0.043 for False 
Alarms and -0.048 for Misses) relative to the slopes during alarms (-0.036 for False 
Alarms and -0.019 for Misses) as well as the greater Y-intercept values during alarms 
(9.53 for False Alarms and 8.18 for Misses) relative to the Y-intercept values during non-
alarms (8.24 for False Alarms and 7.01 for Misses).  The differences in the magnitude of 
the slopes and Y-intercept values suggests that even in the presence of perfectly reliable 
automation, most participants were not as willing to rely on alarms as they were to rely 
on non-alarms.  Presumably, alarms were still salient enough to prompt most participants 
to double-check their validity, even when they had proven reliable for several minutes.  
Another interesting aspect of the data from Figures 15 and 16 is that the R² values of the 
lines from the first 30 minutes are higher than most of R² values from previous conditions 
in which automation errors were involved.  This observed difference in R² values 
suggests that the reliance behavior of a group is more predictable as a function of time 
when the automation is perfectly reliable.  
In general, the pattern of behavior observed in the last 30 minutes of Figures 15 
and 16 was consistent with the pattern of behavior from previous conditions.  During 
alarms (Figure 15), most participants in the False Alarms Condition did not rely on the 
automated alarms, while most participants in the Misses Condition began to rely on them 
toward the end of the experiment, χ2 = 14.3, η2 = .29, p < .05.  During non-alarms (Figure 
16), most participants in the False Alarms Condition began to rely on the automation, 
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while most participants in the Misses Condition began to check the outside view with 











Figure 16. Percentage of participants who pressed the spacebar (y-axis) across each 15 
second time bin (x-axis) as a function of Error Type.  Each point represents the 
percentage of Younger Adults who pressed the spacebar during non-alarms in the 
Second Half Condition. [(Y-intercept and slope) x 10]. 
 
 
A notable difference between the Second Half Condition and the Throughout and 
First Half Conditions was that during alarms, differences in reliance as a function of 
Error Type became apparent at different stages.  In the Throughout and First Half 
Conditions, participants had been exposed to errors for approximately 30 minutes before 
different reliance patterns emerged.  However, in the Second Half Condition (Figure 15), 
this difference in reliance behavior as a function of Error Type appears to emerge only 
after approximately 12 minutes (~bin 170) of being exposed to errors by the automation.  
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This finding suggests that there may be other factors, such as experience with the system, 
which affect the ability of humans to perceive the characteristics of the automation and 
adjust their behavior accordingly.  In the Throughout and First Half Conditions, 
participants were exposed to automation errors from the beginning of the experiment 
while they were still trying to develop a mental representation of the automation.  
However, in the Second Half Condition they were allowed to interact with the system for 
30 minutes before any errors were introduced.  As errors appeared, greater familiarity 
with the system might have contributed to the quicker adjustment in behavior during 
alarms.      
 
Age-related Effects on Reliance: A Micro-Level Analysis 
  
Figures 17 – 22 illustrate the reliance data from the Older Adults in the same 
format that the reliance data from the Younger Adults was presented in the previous 
section.  The objective of this section was to explore at a micro-level, how Error Type 
and the Distribution of Errors affect the reliance behavior of Older Adults across time.  
This analysis showed that there were some similarities in the patterns that older adults 
appear to develop when exposed to the same manipulations.  However, one notable 
difference between the two Age groups was the differences in reliance on the automation 




Throughout Condition  
 
Figures 17 and 18 illustrate the percentage of Older Adults in the Throughout 
Condition who pressed the spacebar during alarms and during non-alarms respectively.  
During alarms, neither the participants in the Misses nor those in the False Alarms 
Condition relied on the automated alarms consistently (Figure 17).  During the first 30 
minutes there were no differences in the percentage of participants who relied on the 
alarms as a function of Error Type, χ2 = .26, η2 = .01, p > .05.  However, during the last 
30 minutes, more participants in the Misses Condition pressed the spacebar than in the 
False Alarms Condition, χ2 = 11.45, η2 = .23, p < .05.  While this difference was contrary 
to what was expected, the percentage of participants in the False Alarms Condition who 
pressed the spacebar during alarms in the last 30 minutes was consistently at or above 
80% (See Figure 17).  Therefore, the data suggest that most participants in both Error 
Type Conditions did not rely on alarms throughout the entire experiment.     
Interestingly, the patterns of reliance as a function of Error Type were 
considerably different within the Younger Adult group, where participants in the Misses 
Condition began to rely on the automated alarms after approximately 30 minutes.  These 
results are consistent with the results of the macro-level analysis, which showed that 
Older Adults relied significantly less on alarms than Younger Adults.  One explanation 
for the different patterns of reliance during alarms as a function of age is older adults’ 
aversion to engaging in risk taking behavior by relying on a system that they know could 
be wrong.  However, in a high workload, dual-task environment, such as the one used in 
this experiment, not relying on the automated alarms increases workload and can 
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negatively affect the performance in concurrent tasks (e.g., the tracking task).  Therefore, 











Figure 17. Percentage of participants who pressed the spacebar (y-axis) across each 15 
second time bin (x-axis) as a function of Error Type.  Each point represents the 
percentage of Older Adults who pressed the spacebar during alarms in the Throughout 
Condition. [(Y-intercept and slope) x 10]. 
 
 
During non-alarms the Older Adults in the False Alarms condition relied more on 
the automation than those in the Misses Condition within the first 30 minutes, χ2 = 92.1, 
η2 = .53, p < .05, and within the last 30 minutes, χ2 = 106.21, η2 = .59, p < .05 (Figure 18).  
This pattern was similar to the one observed for the Younger Adult group, which 
suggests that at least for non-alarms, Older Adults did adjust their behavior according to 
the detection criterion of the automation.  Also, Older Adults demonstrated willingness to 
rely on an automated system that had proven, at times, to be unreliable.  Therefore, a 
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possible explanation for the age-related differences in the pattern of reliance during 
alarms is that the saliency of alarms had a more pronounced effect on older adults, 
making it more challenging for older adults to discern the characteristics of the 











Figure 18. Percentage of participants who pressed the spacebar (y-axis) across each 15 
second time bin (x-axis) as a function of Error Type.  Each point represents the 
percentage of Older Adults who pressed the spacebar during non-alarms in the 
Throughout Condition. [(Y-intercept and slope) x 10]. 
 
 
First Half Condition  
 
Figures 19 and 20 illustrate the percentage of Older Adults in the First Half 
Condition who pressed the spacebar during alarms and during non-alarms, respectively.  
Similar to the results from the Throughout Condition, the pattern of reliance during 
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alarms did not differ as a function of Error Type (Figure 19).  Therefore, it appears that a 
higher concentration of errors during the first 30 minutes did not have an impact on the 
development of distinct patterns of behavior as a function of Error Type.  The higher 
concentration of errors during the first 30 minutes did not impact the behavior of 
Younger Adults either.  However, unlike the behavior of Younger Adults, during the last 
30 minutes of the experiment, when the automation was perfect, there was not a clear 











Figure 19. Percentage of participants who pressed the spacebar (y-axis) across each 15 
second time bin (x-axis) as a function of Error Type.  Each point represents the 
percentage of Older Adults who pressed the spacebar during alarms in the First Half 
Condition. [(Y-intercept and slope) x 10]. 
 
 
This lack of a trend toward reliance during the last 30 minutes of the experiment 
was not consistent with the higher reliability estimates reported by Older Adults in the 
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First Half Condition.  The lack of consistency between the reliance behavior of older 
adults and their estimates of reliability suggests that in some cases objective behaviors 
and subjective estimates of reliability are loosely coupled.  It is also possible that 
subjective estimates of reliability are predictive of future reliance patterns.  Therefore, 
with a longer exposure to the task Older Adults’ behavior might have moved toward 











Figure 20. Percentage of participants who pressed the spacebar (y-axis) across each 15 
second time bin (x-axis) as a function of Error Type.  Each point represents the 
percentage of Older Adults who pressed the spacebar during non-alarms in the First Half 




During non-alarms, most Older Adults in the False Alarms Condition began to 
rely on the automation toward the end of the first 30 minutes, χ2 = 11.05, η2 = .06, p < .05 
and continued to rely on it during the last 30 minutes, χ2 = 76.2, η2 = .43, p < .05 (Figure 
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20).  Conversely, Older Adults in the Misses Condition were not as likely to rely on the 
automation throughout the experiment, although during the last 30 minutes there does 
appear to be a trend toward reliance.  The pattern of behavior observed during the last 30 
minutes of the non-alarm periods resembled the pattern of behavior of the Younger 
Adults. 
 
Second Half Condition  
 
Figures 21 and 22 illustrate the percentage of Older Adults in the Second Half 
Condition who pressed the spacebar during alarms and during non-alarms, respectively.  
The pattern of behavior illustrated in the first 30 minutes of Figures 21 and 22 indicates 
that with perfect automation, reliance increased as a function of time.  Similar to the 
behavior of younger adults, the trend toward reliance during the first 30 minutes was 
greater during non-alarms than during alarms.  This finding provides more support for the 
idea that reliance on automation needs to be examined as a function of the state of the 
system.  Alarms, because of their greater salience, are less conducive to absolute reliance 
than non-alarms.  
During alarms, the pattern of behavior within the last 30 minutes of the 
experiment was similar to the pattern of behavior of the Younger Adults, although within 
the False Alarms Condition, Older Adults relied less on the automation than Younger 
Adults.  Most Older Adults in the False Alarms Condition did not rely on the alarms, 
while participants in the Misses Condition continued to rely on the automation, χ2 = 
26.87, η2 = .55, p < .05.  Interestingly, this condition was the only one in which the Older 
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Adults exhibited different patterns of behavior during alarms as a function of Error Type 
(Figure 21).  This behavior suggests that older adults, when given the opportunity to 
interact with a system under optimal conditions, appear to build enough trust in the 
automation and are able to discern the characteristics of the automation and adjust their 











Figure 21. Percentage of participants who pressed the spacebar (y-axis) across each 15 
second time bin (x-axis) as a function of Error Type.  Each point represents the 
percentage of Older Adults who pressed the spacebar during alarms in the Second Half 
Condition. [(Y-intercept and slope) x 10]. 
 
 
Another interesting aspect related to the behavior of the Older Adults during the 
first 30 minutes of the Second Half Condition is that the R² values of the best fit lines 
were higher than for most of the conditions in which there were automation errors.  This 
trend was also observed with the Younger Adults.  This finding suggests that in the 
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presence of perfect automation, the reliance behavior across older adults is more 











Figure 22. Percentage of participants who pressed the spacebar (y-axis) across each 15 
second time bin (x-axis) as a function of Error Type.  Each point represents the 
percentage of Older Adults who pressed the spacebar during non-alarms in the Second 
Half Condition. [(Y-intercept and slope) x 10]. 
 
 
The Effects of Agricultural Experience on Reliance and Trust 
  
For this analysis, the behavior and performance of the Younger Adult group in 
Experiment 2, who did not have experience operating agricultural vehicles (Non-
Farmers), was compared to the behavior and performance of the participants from 
Experiment 1 (Farmers).  Therefore, the macro-level analysis was treated as a 2 
(Agricultural Experience: Farmers, Non-Farmers) x 2 (Error Type: False Alarms, Misses) 
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between-subjects experiment.  Other than the results reported in this section, there were 




The Non-Farmer groups performed significantly better than the Farmer group in 
the Digit Symbol Substitution test, F(1, 34) = 16.8,  η2 = .31, p < .05, the Shipley 
Vocabulary test, F(1, 34) = 4.7,  η2 = .11,  p < .05, and the Paper Folding Test.  As 
expected, Farmers had more years of experience with agricultural vehicles, F(1, 34) = 
104.6,  η2 = .73, p < .05.  Farmers were also significantly older than Non-Farmers, F(1, 




There were main effects of Error Type on first spacebar presses, spacebar presses 
during alarms, and spacebar presses during non-alarms.  These results were consistent 
with the results from Experiment 2.  Overall, participants in the Misses Condition relied 
less on the automation than participants in the False Alarms Condition, F(1, 34) = 7.3,  η2 
= .17, p < .05.  Similarly, participants in the Misses Condition relied less on the 
automation during non-alarms than participants in the False Alarms Condition, F(1, 34) = 
16.4, η2 = .31, p < .05.  During alarms, participants in the False Alarms Condition relied 
                                                 
5 For the ANOVA table with all of the comparisons by Age and Error Type see Appendix H 
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less on the automation than those in the Misses Condition, F(1, 34) = 58.7, η2 = .62, p < 
.05. 








Figure 23. Non-reliance (first spacebar presses) by agricultural experience for all Farmers 
and Non-Farmers.  Error bars represent the standard error of the mean. 
 
 
While there were no differences as a function of agricultural experience on first 
spacebar presses, there was a main effect of agricultural experience on spacebar presses 
during alarms, where Farmers relied less on the automation than Non-Farmers, F(1, 34) = 
11.9, η2 = .25, p < .05 (Figure 23).  This finding suggests that Farmers were less willing 
to rely on alarms from an automated system that had proven to be unreliable. 
Interestingly, there were no main effects of agricultural experience on subjective trust and 
perceived reliability.  The lack of a difference suggests that subjective trust ratings and 
estimates of reliability, while they are usually related to overall reliance, they are not 


















depth breakdown of the reliance data is presented in the following section, which 




Figures 24 and 25 illustrate the percentage of Farmers in the Throughout 
Condition who pressed the spacebar during alarms and during non-alarms, respectively.  
The main effect of agricultural experience on reliance during alarms found in the macro-
level analysis appears to be a product of Farmers in the Misses Condition not adjusting 
their behavior to the criterion of the automation.  The analysis of the Non-Farmers’ 
reliance data during alarms, indicated that during the last 30 minutes of the experiment 
most participants in the Misses Condition began to rely on the alarms.  However, this 
trend was not as obvious for the Farmer group.   
Even though the percentage of Farmers in the False Alarms Condition who did 
not rely on alarms is significantly higher than the percentage in the Misses Condition 
during the first 30 minutes, χ2 = 17.14, η2 = .35, p < .05, and during the last 30 minutes, χ2 
= 23.12, η2 = .47, p < .05, the data from Figure 24 show that most Farmers (70% or more) 
in the Misses Condition continued to double check the validity of the alarms throughout 
the experiment.   
One explanation for the different patterns of reliance on alarms as a function of 
agricultural experience is that Farmers are accustomed to interacting with automated 
systems that are generally robust, which means that the automated systems seldom make 
errors, unless they are caused by a permanent malfunction.  Therefore, any error by the 
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automation might have been perceived by the Farmers as a sign that the collision 
avoidance system was permanently damaged and therefore they were less willing to rely 
on the automated alarms.  Another factor that could have contributed to this difference in 
behavior as a function of Agricultural Experience is that the perception of the cost of an 
error might have been inherently higher for Farmers. The collision of an agricultural 
vehicle with any object usually has a very high cost associated with it.  Not only is the 
equipment expensive, but it usually means that the vehicle is disabled to some capacity 











Figure 24. Percentage of participants who pressed the spacebar (y-axis) across each 15 
second time bin (x-axis) as a function of Error Type.  Each point represents the 
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The reliance data from the non-alarm periods (Figure 25) show that different 
patterns of behavior did emerge as a function of Error Type, especially during the last 30 
minutes, χ2 = 66.6, η2 = .37, p < .05.  This behavior suggests that Farmers are willing to 
rely on a faulty automated system during non-alarms.  The results from Experiment 1 are 
consistent with the behavior observed in Experiment 2, where most participants were 












Figure 25. Percentage of participants who pressed the spacebar (y-axis) across each 15 
second time bin (x-axis) as a function of Error Type.  Each point represents the 
percentage of Farmers who pressed the spacebar during non-alarms. [(Y-intercept and 
slope) x 10]. 
 
 
Interestingly, the slopes of both lines during the first 30 minutes in Figure 25 
(during non-alarms) suggest a trend toward reliance by participants in both the False 
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Alarms and Misses Conditions.  This pattern toward reliance was not observed for the 
Non-Farmer group.  The trend toward reliance of non-alarms by the Farmer group could 
be a product of prior experience.  Most automated systems in agricultural vehicles have a 
loose criterion setting, which means that if the system does generate an error it is more 
likely to be a false alarm (A. Greer, personal communication, February, 2005).  
Therefore, farmers are not used to unreliable events being in the form of automation 
misses, which is a possible reason why there is a trend toward reliance during non-alarms 
within the first 30 minutes of the experiment. However, with some exposure to the 
system, the different patterns of reliance became clearer (see the last 30 minutes in Figure 
25).  As expected, most participants in the False Alarms Condition continued the trend 
toward reliance on the automation, while those in the Misses Condition began to verify 
its validity with increased frequency.      
The tendency of Farmers to not rely on the automation as much as Non-Farmers 
was not consistent with the results of Riley (1996).  The results of his experiment showed 
that pilots, who were the experimental group with more automation experience, were 
more likely to rely on faulty automation than non-pilots (college undergraduates).  
Riley’s explanation for this finding was that the costs associated with errors in the 
experimental task were considerably less than the costs of an error in the flight deck.  
Furthermore, the automation supported task was distinguishing letters from numbers.  
Perhaps this task did not invoke the tendencies and biases of pilots associated with the 
use of automation.  Given the apparent lack of ecological validity of the experimental 
task, it is not surprising that pilots’ experience with automation in the flight deck did not 
transfer into their interaction with the automation in the experiment.    
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Detection of the Exception Error   
 
The last automation error in each experimental condition was the opposite of the 
rest of the errors.  The main purpose for including the exception error was to contribute to 
the understanding of the effects that the prevalence of each Error Type have on the 
probability of “catching” an automation error.  If reliance on the automation is affected 
by the prevalence of an Error Type in the way in which the data of this investigation have 
shown, then in the event that an uncommon automation error occurs, the probability of a 
collision should be higher than if the non-reliance behavior of humans was simply 
random.  The combined results from Experiments 1 and 2 showed that 123 out of 140 
participants failed to detect the exception error by the automation, which means only 
12.1% of the exception errors were detected and did not result in a collision.  This 
percentage was considerably lower than the percentage of the rest of the automation 
errors that were detected (54%).   
The considerably lower detection rate of the exception error, relative to the rest of 
the errors, provides more evidence that humans adjust their behavior based on the 
criterion of the automation.  This finding has an important practical implication.  Once 
human behavior is changed due to the prevalence of a particular error, there is a lower 
probability that the human will detect an uncommon automation error.  For example, in a 
system in which false alarms are prevalent, the human will likely have adjusted his/her 
behavior such that reliance on the automation during non-alarm periods is high.  
Therefore, in the event of an automation miss, it is not likely that the human will serve an 
effective backup role to the automation.   
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Effects of First and Subsequent Failures on Reliance 
  
To determine the effects of each error on reliance, the number of participants who 
pressed the spacebar in the fifteen second bin after every automation error was subtracted 
from the number of participants who pressed the spacebar in the bin before the error.  
Figures I1 – I6, in Appendix I, illustrate changes in non-reliance for each error.  Overall, 
the results of this analysis did not provide clear evidence for drastic changes toward non-
reliance after each error.  It appears that the trend toward non-reliance as result of 
exposure to errors was more gradual and therefore was not apparent through an analysis 
of such narrow scope (Figures I1 – I6).  Riley (1996) also found that “automation use 
after each failure was not less than before the failure” (p. 26).      
There is however, partial evidence for the possible existence of the first error 
effect.  Wickens and Xu (2002) argued that when the first automation error is preceded 
by an extensive period of perfect automation, the expectations of the human have a 
tendency to increase.  Therefore, the appearance of the first error can have a considerable 
impact on reliance and trust.  In an analysis of the Second Half Condition, where the first 
error appeared after the automation had been perfect for 30 minutes, there was a notable 
change toward non-reliance after the first error (Table I1, Appendix I).  However, the 
first error effect was not as apparent in the Throughout and First Half Conditions.  An 
explanation for the lack of the first error effect in the Throughout and First Half 
Conditions was the low expectations of the automation prior to beginning the experiment, 
which were evident by the high percentage of participants who pressed the spacebar 
during the first minute of the experiment (See Figures 11 – 22).  
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Tracking Task Performance 
  
One of the benefits of receiving support from an automated system is that it can 
reduce the workload for a specific task while freeing up cognitive and physical resources.  
In a multi-task environment, these resources can be allocated to performing concurrent 
tasks (Wickens & Xu, 2002).  Therefore, human performance in tasks without automation 
support is often an indicator of reliance on the automation.  If the human trusts and relies 
on the automation, performance on concurrent tasks should be higher than if the human 
has to constantly use time and resources to verify the validity of the support provided by 
the automation.    
The simulation used in the current investigation required participants to perform 
two tasks.  The first was the collision avoidance task which was supported by an 
automated system.  The second task was a tracking task, which was performed manually.  
The simulator was configured so that participants were forced to abandon one task to 
perform an action on the other task.  For example, if someone wanted to view the outside 
window, the buttons necessary to perform the tracking task would cease to work while 
the spacebar was being pressed. 
The main measure of performance for the tracking task was the “number of acres 
lost due to tracking error.”  This measure was calculated by adding the total amount of 
time that the square was left on the edge of the box and dividing it by 15.  In study 2, 
participants in the Misses Condition committed significantly more errors than participants 
in the False Alarms Condition, F(1, 108) = 7.6, η2 = .07, p < .05.  Furthermore, Older 
Adults performed significantly worse than Younger Adults, F(1, 108) = 63.9, η2 = .37, p 
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< .05.  This age-related difference in tracking performance might have been due in part 
the increased non-reliance on the automation during alarms by Older Adults.   
 
 







Figure 26. Tracking task performance (red events) by Age and Error Type.  Error bars 
represent the standard error of the mean. 
 
 
Another performance measure for the tracking task was the number of times that 
participants allowed the square to reach the edge; these instances were labeled “red 
events.”  The advantage of this measure relative to the number of acres lost due to 
tracking error was that it accounted for all instances in which the square was allowed to 
reach the edge.  In Experiment 2, there was a main effect of Error Type on number of red 
events where participants in the Misses Condition allowed significantly more red events 
than participants in the False Alarms Condition, F(1, 108) = 10.6, η2 = .09, p < .05.  There 
was also a main effect of Age, where Older Adults allowed more red events than 




























interaction between Age and Error Type, F(1, 108) = 4.9, η2 = .04, p < .05 (See Figure 
26).  For the Older Adults, the prevalence of Misses had a significantly negative impact 
on the tracking task performance relative to False Alarms.  This difference as a function 
of Error Type was not present for the Younger Adults.  A correlation analysis also 
showed that there was a positive relationship between the number of red events and the 
number of acres lost to tracking error, r(120) =  .95, p < .01.     
The results of the tracking performance data were consistent with the pattern of 
results obtained for participants’ reliance on the automation, which showed that 
participants in the Misses Condition relied less on the automation than participants in the 
False Alarms Condition.  This behavior likely contributed to their poor performance in 
the tracking task.  These current results support the idea that not relying on the 
automation can increase workload, which can contribute to performance decrements in 
other tasks.  However, the main question of interest in the analysis of the tracking task 
performance was does Error Type affect concurrent task performance?  The answer to 
this question depends on the type of system that is being evaluated.  In a system that 
generates alarms with a high frequency, the prevalence of automation false alarms, 
relative to misses, would likely result in worse performance for concurrent tasks.  
Conversely, in a system in which alarms are rare, the prevalence of automation misses 
would be more detrimental to performance in concurrent tasks.  This does not mean that 
the decision to set the criterion of the automation should be based purely on trying to 
increase performance in concurrent tasks.  However, having some knowledge of the 
effects of Error Type on concurrent task performance can help predict the types of 
situations when a human’s attentional resources might be limited.   
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Obstacle Detection Performance 
 
The performance measures used to evaluate obstacle detection by participants 
were total number of errors, false positive and false negative rates.  The total number of 
errors consisted of any mistake that was made in the collision avoidance task.  The 
maximum number of errors possible during the experiment was 240.  The maximum 
number of errors caused by the automation was 11.   
 










Figure 27. Total number of collision errors by Error Type. Error bars represent the 
standard error of the mean. 
 
Older Adults committed more errors than Younger Adults, F(1, 108) = 28.2, η2 = 
.21, p < .05, and participants in the Misses Condition made more errors than those in the 






















of the task, it was not surprising that participants in the Misses Condition made more 
errors than participants in the False Alarms Condition.  Participants in the Misses 
Condition had to constantly check the outside window during non-alarms if they wanted 
to avoid colliding with a deer, while participants in the False Alarms Condition only had 
to check the outside window during alarms.  However, if participants had not adjusted 
their reliance behavior as a function of Error Type, it is likely that the average number of 
errors would have been much higher for both Error Type groups. 
 
False Negative and Positive Rates 
 
False positive and negative rates represent the human’s ability to correctly 
“avoid” deer, irrespective of what the collision avoidance alarm was reporting.  The 
reason for examining rates rather than total number of false positives and negatives 
independently is that the ratio of events with no deer and deer differed as a function of 
the Error Type manipulation (189:51 for the false alarm condition and 180:60 for the 
Misses Condition).  
For false negative rate, there was a significant interaction between Age and Error 
Type, F(1, 108) = 13.1, η2 = .11, p < .05.  Older Adults had a higher false negative rate 
than Younger Adults within the Misses Condition but not within the False Alarms 
Condition.  There was a main effect of Age, where Older adults had a higher false 
negative rate than Younger Adults, F(1, 108) = 16.9, η2 = .14, p < .05.  Furthermore, the 
Misses Condition led to a higher false negative rate than the False Alarms Condition, F(1, 
108) = 52.4, η2 = .33, p < .05.   
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Overall, the false positive rate was higher for Older Adults than for Younger 
Adults, F(1, 108) = 27.5, η2 = .20, p < .05, and the False Alarms Condition also led to a 
higher false positive rate than the Misses Condition, F(1, 108) = 14.7, η2 = .12, p < .05.  It 
was not surprising that a prevalence of automation misses led to a higher rate of false 
negatives and more automation false alarms led to a higher rate of false positives.  
However, had humans not adjusted their reliance behavior as a function of the criterion 
setting of the collision avoidance system, it is expected that the difference in false 






The main objective of the current investigation was to gain an understanding of 
how specific variables affect human behavior in automated environments.  The specific 
variables that were targeted in this investigation were ones that have either been 
overlooked in previous research efforts or have been the source of contradictory findings.  
A unique aspect of this investigation was the aim to understand how humans gather 
evidence about the characteristics of the automation and how this information affects 
behavior over time.  An analysis of changes in behavior over time was critical to 
understanding the development of different patterns of reliance on the automation as a 
function of the experimental manipulations.   
 
Does Error Type Affect Reliance on Automation?  
 
Yes. One of the most influential findings from this investigation was the different 
patterns of reliance that emerged as a function of Error Type.  Clearly, the detection 
criterion of an automated system has an impact on the reliance behavior of humans.  
When the unreliability of a system consists primarily of automation misses, humans 
adjust their reliance behavior accordingly to constantly monitor alternate sources of 
information while the automation is idle (during non-alarms).  However, a prevalence of 
automation misses, while it leads to non-reliance on the automation during idle states, is 
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also conducive to reliance on automated alarms.  Conversely, when a system is laden 
with false alarms, non-reliance behavior becomes prevalent in the presence of automated 
alarms.  In this situation, the appearance of an alarm becomes a proxy to check alternate 
sources of information with the goal of verifying the validity of that alarm.    











Figure 28.  The relationship between variables specific to the automation, reliance, and 
system performance.  The “+” sign indicates a positive relationship between two 
variables and the “-” sign indicates a negative relationship.  The entire model can be 
found in Appendix J.      
 
Figure 28 illustrates a conceptual model of the relationships between reliability, 
perceived reliability, reliance, and system performance.  The “+” sign indicates a positive 
relationship between two variables and the “-” sign a negative one.  For example, the 
relationship between automation reliability and perceived reliability is positive, which 
means that as automation reliability increases, perceived reliability also increases.  The 
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different patterns of reliance that result as a function of different error types by the 
automation add a level of complexity to the relationship between automation reliability 
and reliance.  Previous models of trust in automation (e.g., Dzindolet et al., 2001; Riley, 
1996; Sanchez, 2005) have suggested that there are positive relationships between 
automation reliability, perceived reliability, and reliance.  The positive relationship 
between automation reliability and reliance is usually based on the definition of reliability 
that treats it as a “consistency across measurements”, which is how reliability is generally 
defined in a statistical sense (Jackson & Messick, 1978).  However, the findings of this 
investigation suggest that depending on the state of the system, false alarms and misses 
can each lead to both positive and negative relationships between reliability and reliance.  
Therefore, when describing the effects that automation reliability has on reliance, 
reliability can no longer be defined strictly as the rate of errors that are made by the 
automation (Wickens & Xu, 2002), but also the type of error that is prevalent need to be 
considered.  An integrated version of the relationships illustrated in Figure 28 and the 
Sanchez (2005) model can be found in Appendix J.  
 
Do Humans Adjust Optimally to Automation Error Type? 
 
Perfect performance in the experimental task used in this investigation is 
comprised of zero errors (no acres lost) in both the collision avoidance task and the 
tracking task.  No participant was able reach this level of performance.  Hypothetically, if 
a participant had chosen to always rely on the automation, they would have ended with 
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11 errors in the collision avoidance task.6  Conversely, if someone had chosen to “never” 
rely on the automation by constantly pressing the spacebar, they might have achieved 
optimal performance on the collision avoidance task, but their performance on the 
tracking task would have suffered.  The strategy to achieve perfect performance consisted 
of an “optimal balance”7 in the amount of time and effort spent pressing the spacebar and 
performing the tracking task.     
The patterns of behavior that emerged as a function of Error Type suggest that 
humans adjust their behavior in an attempt to collaborate more effectively with the 
automation.  In essence, humans calibrate their behavior according to the capabilities and 
limitations of the automation in an attempt to increase overall system performance.  The 
identification of this self-adjustment in reliance makes an important contribution to the 
field of human-automation interaction, specifically to the idea of appropriate 
trust/reliance.   
Appropriate trust and appropriate reliance are terms used to describe a match 
between the perceived capabilities of the automation by the human and the actual 
capabilities of the automation (Lee & Moray, 1994; Lee & See, 2004).  For example, if a 
collision avoidance system has a high false alarm rate during rainy conditions, 
appropriate reliance would consist of frequently checking the validity of automated 
alarms when it is raining, while relying on the automated alarms when it is not raining.  
The results of this investigation indicate that humans adjust their behavior as a function 
of the types of errors by the automation, which suggests that humans can and do gather 
                                                 
6 No participant adopted this strategy 
7 There is not an exact amount of time and effort that defines an “optimal balance,” rather “optimal 
balance” likely consists of a range of time and effort spent on each task.  The exact point in that range 
depends on individual differences in the abilities required to perform the task.  
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information that helps them increase the instances of appropriate reliance on the 
automation.  This trend toward appropriate reliance suggests that humans are constantly 
trying to adjust their behavior to achieve equilibrium between overall system 
performance and workload.   
The relationships illustrated in Figure 28 suggest that while high automation 
reliability leads to an increase in the probability of correct outcomes, it also indirectly 
leads to a lower probability of a correct outcome during a failure by the automation (See 
Skitka et al., 1999 for an example).  The reason for this paradoxical relationship between 
automation reliability and system performance is that interacting with automation of high 
reliability for extended periods of time leads to over reliance (Parasuraman et al., 1993).  
Once the human begins to over rely on the automation, the probability of a system error8 
increases in the event that the automation makes an error.  The effects of different error 
types have a similar consequence on reliance such that the prevalence of each error type 
can lead to over reliance on the automation depending on the state of the system.  For 
example, in a system in which automation misses are prevalent, humans will likely adjust 
their reliance behavior to almost always rely on alarms.  This behavior will have a 
negative impact on the probability of avoiding a system error during an automation false 
alarm.  In a system where automation false alarms are prevalent, the human’s reliance 
behavior will reduce the probability of detecting an automation miss.  Therefore, while 
the adjustment of behavior as a function of the criterion of the automation suggests a 
trend toward appropriate reliance, such a shift in behavior does not occur without some 
shortcomings to overall system performance.   
                                                 
8 A system error is an instance in which the wrong output is generated by the system, irrespective 
of which of the system components (human or automation) caused it.  For a list of technical terms 
and definitions see Appendix K 
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The Meaning of Alarms  
 
Another important finding of this investigation was the reluctance of humans to 
rely on the automation during alarms relative to non-alarm periods.  For example, in the 
first 30 minutes of the experiment, most Younger Adults (First Half and Throughout 
Conditions) were more reluctant to rely on the automation during alarms than they were 
to rely on it during non-alarms.  Even in the Second Half Condition, where the 
automation was perfect for 30 minutes, the trend toward reliance on the automation was 
greater during non-alarm periods than during alarms.  This behavior suggests that the 
different ways in which automation can provide support, via alarms and non-alarms, 
affect the way humans gather evidence about the reliability of the automation and the 
manner in which they adjust their behavior accordingly.  Presumably, because of their 
salience, alarms prompt an increased tendency toward non-reliance relative to non-
alarms. 
 
Does it Matter When Errors Occur?  
 
Yes. The Distribution of Errors along a specific range of time affects estimates of 
the reliability of the automation and subjective trust ratings.  The results of this 
investigation suggest that a more recent exposure to errors has a greater impact on 
perceived reliability and trust than an exposure to errors during the initial interaction with 
an automated system.  This finding is consistent with the results of previous studies, 
which have shown that trust does recover when the automation behaves reliably for an 
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extended period of time following an error or string of errors (Lee & Moray, 1992; 1994).  
The findings of this investigation suggest that there is a negative relationship between 
perceived reliability and the recency of errors9 by the automation.  This means that if 
humans are given sufficient time with error-free automation, their perception of it is 
likely to “recover.”  The negative relationship between recency of errors and perceived 
reliability is illustrated in the conceptual model of human-automation interaction, which 
can be found in Appendix J.   
The different Distribution of Errors also had an impact on overall reliance.  
Overall, participants in the First and Second Half conditions relied more on the 
automation than participants in the Throughout Condition.  This finding suggests that 
when automation frequently and randomly generates errors, humans’ reliance is more 
likely to remain lower than if the automation behaves reliably for an extended period of 
time.   
Interestingly, a higher concentration of errors in the first half of the experiment 
did not lead to an earlier development of different patterns of reliance as a function of 
Error Type as was expected.  In both the First Half and Throughout Conditions, the 
different patterns of behavior emerged in the last 30 minutes of the experiment.  
However, in the Second Half Condition in which participants interacted with perfect 
automation for the first 30 minutes, the different patterns of behavior as a function of 
Error Type emerged shortly after the appearance of errors.   
The earlier emergence of different reliance patterns during the last 30 minutes of 
the Second Half Condition highlights the effect that familiarity with a system has on 
                                                 
9 Recency of errors: time between errors and when the participant is asked to provide an estimate of the 
automation’s reliability or a rating of trust. 
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human interaction with automated systems.  Wickens and Xu (2002) suggested that 
experience with a system is an important factor in the effects that different automation 
specific variables, specifically errors by the automation, have on human behavior.  The 
results of this investigation suggest that when humans are allowed to build trust in an 
automated system, the development of different reliance patterns as a function of error 
type, especially during alarms, occurs faster than if humans are exposed to errors early in 
their interaction with the automation.   
The effects of Distribution of Errors on reliance and trust observed in this 
investigation also shed light on the complex relationship between automation reliability 
and reliance.  Specifically, these results suggest that when investigating the relationship 
between automation reliability and human reliance, it is critical to consider when 
automation errors occur.  The impact of each error on objective behaviors, such as 
reliance, and subjective perceptions, such as trust, depends on the amount of experience 
and familiarity the human has with the automation.  The implication of these findings to 
future research efforts in the field of human-automation interaction is that the term 
“overall reliability” is not sufficient to describe the effect that the error rate of the 
automation has on human behavior.  Perhaps when referring to the error rate of the 
automation, a term such as “consistency of the automation” might be better suited than 
“reliability of the automation.”  In addition to defining the consistency of the automation, 
it is also critical to describe and consider how errors are distributed throughout the 




Does Age Matter in Human-Automation Interaction?   
 
Yes. Older Adults relied less on automated alarms than Younger Adults.  
However, it appears that this age-related difference is not due to an aversion to using 
automation.  The reluctance to rely on the automation during alarms, relative to non-
alarms suggests that older adults have a more conservative approach when dealing with a 
system that has proven to be faulty at times.  This conservative approach is only evident 
with reliance on alarms.  However, the unwillingness of older adults to rely on alarms is 
considerably mitigated when they are given sufficient time and experience to build their 
trust in the automation.  Therefore, the different patterns of reliance as a function of age 
are more likely to be a product of age-related differences in the development of 
appropriate trust in the automation.  Because it takes older adults longer to discern the 
detection criterion of the automation, it also takes them longer to adjust their reliance 
behavior.  This finding is consistent with the results of Sit and Fisk (1999), which showed 
that older adults take longer to modify their biases, especially with tasks that require 
“higher-order, strategic processing” (p. 26).     
Interestingly, the reliability estimates and trust ratings of Older Adults were 
higher than those of Younger Adults.  This finding is likely to be a product of the age-
related benefits associated with having automated support in a multi-task environment 
with high attentional demands.  When automated support has a high overall reliability, as 
it did in this investigation, older adults experience greater benefits from its presence.  
Without the automated support it is likely that age-related differences in performance 
would be greater.  Previous research has found that as the reliability of the automation 
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degrades, older adults report lower trust ratings and reliability estimates than younger 
adults (Sanchez et al., 2004).  However, other studies in which task demands (number of 
tasks and time pressure) were low, have not reported age-related differences in trust and 
perceived reliability (McCarley et al., 2003).  This contrast in findings suggests that the 
workload demands of a system have an important effect on the perceived utility of the 
automation as a function of age.   
In summary, it appears that an aversion toward technology by older adults is not 
the main factor driving age-related differences in human-automation interaction.  The 
evidence from this investigation suggests that while it does take older adults longer (more 
trials) to adjust their behavior in accordance to the characteristics of the automation, they 
eventually do adjust.  Once older adults adjust their behavior, the age-related differences 
in reliance on the automation are considerably mitigated.  Also, the results of previous 
studies, as well as the current one, indicate that when the automation has a high level of 
reliability, age-related differences in subjective trust and perceived reliability are 
uncommon.     
 
Does Domain Experience Matter in Human-Automation Interaction?   
 
The most notable domain experience-related difference found in this investigation 
was the unwillingness of most Farmers to rely on the automated alarms.  One explanation 
for this domain experience-related difference in reliance is that there may be differences 
in the preconceived meaning of an automation error by the Farmers group.  Farmers 
might view any automation error as a permanent malfunction.  This difference in the way 
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errors are perceived can lead to a more cautious approach in the reliance on alarms.  This 
finding highlights the importance of prior expectations of the automation and reliance on 
it.  It appears that there is a negative relationship between prior expectations of the 
automation and perceived reliability.  As expectations of the automation are higher, any 
error will have a stronger negative impact on perceived reliability (See Appendix J).   
 
The Construct of Trust 
 
 In one of the first publications that focused on the integration of the trust 
construct and the interaction of humans and automated systems, Muir (1987) argued that 
“the concept of trust is a critical one in the design of decision support systems” (p. 527).  
Since Muir’s publication, the role of trust in human-automation systems has received a 
considerable amount of attention, evident by the number of studies have been conducted 
to asses and understand the role of trust in human-automation interaction.  The results of 
these studies have shed some light on the effects that various system variables such as 
reliability have on subjective attitudes toward automated systems (for reviews see Cohen, 
Parasuraman & Freeman, 1999; Lee & See, 2004; Muir, 1994; for a scale of trust see 
Jian, Bisantz & Drury, 2000).   
In a recent and comprehensive review of the literature relevant to trust in 
automation, Lee and See (2004) defined trust as “the attitude that an agent will help 
achieve and individual’s goals in a situation characterized by uncertainty and 
vulnerability” (p. 54).  There are two key components in Lee and See’s definition. The 
first is that trust is defined as an attitude, not an objective behavior.  This is an important 
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distinction, as “trust” is often times used interchangeably to describe objective behaviors 
such as reliance.  While there is evidence of a strong relationship between trust and the 
use of automation (Moray et al., 2000; Sanchez et al., 2004; Skitka et al., 1999; Vries et 
al., 2003), there is also evidence to suggest that it is not the only factor that predicts use 
(Dzindolet et al., 2003; Lee & Moray, 1992; Riley, 1996).   
The second part of Lee and See’s definition mentions situations of uncertainty and 
vulnerability.  Because automated systems are seldom 100% accurate, understanding the 
level of trust on a system serves as a valuable indicator of the likelihood of use.  
Therefore, from an applied standpoint, gauging operator trust is helpful in making 
predictions about behavior toward automation in situations of uncertainty.  For example, 
in complex systems where the human does not have access to or an understanding of the 
information needed to make a decision, trust will likely predict behaviors such as 
reliance.  From a research standpoint, trust serves as an indicator of the perceived 
reliability of an automated system.  This allows researchers to parse out other variables 
that might influence objective behaviors.  For example, if trust ratings are low while the 
use of the automation is high, it is likely that other variables such as workload might be 
influencing objective behavior.  However, the low levels of trust indicate that the human 
is perceptive to factors such as low reliability, which affect the perception of the 
automation. 
The results of the current investigation indicated that there was a strong 
relationship between subjective trust and reliance.  Furthermore, there was also a strong 
relationship between reliance and perceived reliability, which is another way to measure 
perceptions of the human about the automation.  Interestingly, the relationship between 
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trust and perceived reliability was not significant, and the patterns of trust and perceived 
reliability differed as a function of Distribution of Errors.  This disconnection between 
trust and perceived reliability, suggests that the construct of subjective trust has a number 
of different components.  To date, we do not have a good understanding of what these 




Design of Automated Systems 
 
The main issue with human-automation interaction across a variety of domains is 
the paradoxical problem that stems from the presence of automation in systems, which is 
that highly reliable automation, while desirable in terms of improving overall system 
performance, negatively affects human performance (evident by poor monitoring).  As 
long as the human remains an integral component of the human-automation system, the 
formula for successful human-automation interaction is the congruency between the 
human’s system representation and the design parameters of the automation.  The 
findings of this investigation showed that humans can and do gather information about 
the automation that helps them adjust their behavior to best collaborate with it.  In 
general, the acquired patterns of behavior as a function of the characteristics of the 
automation suggest that humans strive for optimal system performance.   
 
 102
Knowing the effects of specific variables on human-automation interaction can 
help designers of automated systems make some predictions about human behavior and 
system performance as a function of the characteristics of the automation.  For example, 
based on the detection criterion of the automation, human operators are likely to develop 
distinct patterns of reliance.  These distinct patterns can be used to make some 
predictions about the allocation of attention and workload during different states of the 
automation.  Of course, the current findings regarding the effects of error type should not 
be used as the sole basis by which the detection criterion of an automated system is set.  
This decision must be made with knowledge of other important parameters specific to 
any system, such as the cost of errors. 
Another finding from this investigation with important practical implications was 
the low detection rate of the exception error.  This result suggests that once an operator 
develops a specific pattern of non-reliance, the probability of catching an uncommon 
automation error will be low.  This can be particularly important if the criterion of the 
automation is set to protect against the type of error with the highest cost.  For example, 
an automation miss by a system that detects ice on the wings of a plane can lead to the 
plane crashing at takeoff.  Therefore, the criterion of this system is likely to be set so that 
it generates an alarm in the presence of the slightest indication of ice.  This criterion 
setting is also likely to generate false alarms with a much higher frequency than it misses.  
Over time, the human responsible for monitoring the output from the ice warning system 
might become over reliant on the automation, especially in the absence of alarms.  
Therefore, the probability of detecting ice on the wing in the event of miss by the 
automation is likely to decrease.   
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Future Investigations of Human-Automation Interaction 
 
The patterns of reliance observed in this investigation not only have an impact on 
our understanding of human-automation interaction, but also inform future investigations 
in this field about methodological issues that should be considered.  The existence of 
different patterns of behavior as a function of error type suggest that, in addition to 
considering variables such as the overall reliability of the automation, it is critical to 
control for and anticipate the effects that variables such as error type and the distribution 
of errors can have on behavior.  Furthermore, the analyses of behaviors such as reliance, 
must take into consideration that humans develop distinct patterns of reliance that are 
dependent on the state of the automation.  Therefore, it is not sufficient to examine 
behavior at the macro-level if the objective of this field is to gain a thorough 
understanding of the way humans gather evidence about the automation and how they 
adjust their behavior accordingly.    
To truly understand the effects of reliability on trust and reliance, it is critical to 
clearly and effectively calculate automation reliability.  The reported reliability of the 
automated collision avoidance system used in this investigation was 95.4%.  This value 
was calculated by dividing the number of events in which the automation provided 
accurate support (229) by the total number of events in which the automation provided 
support (240).  However, this is not the way in which automation reliability is always 
calculated in this field of research.  For example, some studies do not include periods of 
correct rejection when calculating the reliability of the automation (e.g., Crocoll & Curry, 
1990; Dixon & Wickens, 2003; 2004; Sanchez et al., 2004).  One reason for the exclusion 
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of correct rejection periods in calculating the reliability of automated systems, is that the 
lack of understanding of the effect of periods of correct rejection on trust in and reliance 
on the automation.  For example, assuming that a correct alarm leads to an increase in 
trust in the automation, it is unclear what the equivalent length of correct rejection time is 
to have the same effect on trust.  Therefore, future empirical investigations that shed light 
into the way humans weigh different events by the automation are critical to further our 
understanding of the automation reliability – reliance relationship.   
 
Where We Have Been, Where We Are Now, and Where We Should Go 
 
Rather than providing an extensive list of follow-up experiments to the current 
investigation, it may prove more productive to briefly review the historical research 
trends from the field of human-automation interaction and examine the current state of 
the field.  This approach might make the contributions that have been made to both the 
theoretical and applied areas more clear, and shed light on the future paths of research 
that are worth pursuing.  The objective of this field is to understand human behavior in 
automated environments.  From a scientific standpoint, understanding human behavior in 
automated environments can inform psychological theories of attention (Molloy & 
Parasuraman, 1996; Parasuraman, Mouloua & Molloy, 1996; Parasuraman et al., 1993), 
and workload (Bliss & Dunn, 2000; Wickens & Dixon, 2005) among others.  From an 
applied standpoint, understanding human capabilities and limitations impacts the design 




Where We Have Been 
 
Some of the earlier work related to human-automation interaction focused on the 
optimal allocation of functions between humans and machines (e.g., Fitts, 1951) and the 
distribution of responsibilities within a single task between human and machine agents 
(e.g., Price, 1985; Sheridan & Verplank, 1978).  This line of research generated much 
discussion about the criteria that should be used for function allocation.  Naturally, these 
discussions stimulated research to understand human capabilities and limitations with the 
goal of making more informed decisions about function allocation.      
Parasuraman (1987) and Muir (1987) were some of the first to consider the effects 
of automation on human behavior.  They discussed issues such as over and under reliance 
on automation and the consequences associated with such acquired behaviors.  During 
this time there was also a growing concern about the increase of accidents as a possible 
result of automation-induced behaviors (National Research Council, 1997).   
Since the Parasuraman (1987) and Muir (1987) articles, a considerable amount of 
research has been conducted in an effort to understand human behavior in automated 
environments.  In one of the first studies that examined human behavior, Lee and Moray 
(1992) investigated the effects of failures by an automated system on trust and reliance.  
Research efforts since Lee and Moray’s paper have followed in their footsteps, trying to 
understand how variables such as automation reliability, workload, and the type of 
automation among others, affect trust in automation and reliance on it. 
Unfortunately, the last 20 years of the research in this field lacks a truly 
systematic approach.  With few exceptions, a majority of the studies have been isolated 
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efforts that failed to extract the key findings from previous investigations to formulate 
and test new hypotheses.  A clear example of the lack of a systematic approach is the 
number of studies that have attempted to understand the relationship between automation 
reliability and reliance while ignoring critical components of reliability such as error 
type.  As it turns out, the results of the current investigation show that the effects of 
reliability on reliance are moderated by the type of error that is prevalent in the system.  
The findings of the current investigation, suggest that it may be worth revisiting some of 
the conclusions that have been made in studies that investigated the effects of automation 
reliability on reliance. 
 
Where We Are Now 
 
Stepping back on the optimistic side, even with the lack of a systematic approach, 
the findings from this field have had an impact on a number of psychological theories 
(e.g., workload, sustained attention) as well as the design of systems across a variety of 
domains (e.g., surface transportation, aviation, medical systems).  During the last decade, 
a handful of literature reviews have been instrumental in redirecting the efforts of this 
field (e.g., Meyer, 2004; Parasuraman & Riley, 1997; Pritchett, 2001; Sheridan, 2002).  
Most recently, Lee and See (2004) discussed the importance of working toward an 
understanding of appropriate trust and reliance (Lee & See, 2004), which means using or 
relying on the automation only in situations that it is designed to handle.  The underlying 
importance of the concept of appropriate reliance is that it redefines the automation 
reliability – reliance relationship as a conditional, dynamic process, rather than an 
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absolute (rely or not rely), static one.  A number of research efforts are beginning to 
investigate human-automation interaction while attempting to discern the variables 
critical to appropriate reliance. 
Another important trend in the current research efforts of the field is the attempt 
to understand how different Levels of Automation (LOA) affect human behavior.  Since 
Parasuraman et al. (2000) proposed a framework of automation, there has been an 
increase in awareness that this is a variable that should not be overlooked.  The results of 
recent studies suggest that reliance and trust change as a function of LOA (Clamman, 
Wright & Kaber, 2002; Endsley & Kaber, 1999; Moray et al., 2000).  However, the 
interaction effects between LOA and variables such as reliability are still not well 
understood.   
So where are we now? We do have a general understanding of the effects that a 
number of variables have on the behavior of humans in automated environments.  This 
knowledge has been captured and summarized by some of the reviews of the literature, 
and by a few comprehensive conceptual models of human-automation interaction that 
have conceptualized some of the cause-effect relationships we are beginning to 
understand (e.g., Riley, 1996; Dzindiolet et al., 2001; Sanchez, 2005).  However, the 
contradictory results of investigations that claim to target similar issues still go 
unexplained.  Furthermore, overgeneralizations based on the results and discussions of a 
few studies are made too often, which results in a failure to address and understand the 




Where We Should Go 
 
Research in this field will continue to be motivated in part by the emergence of 
new technologies that allow machines to perform higher level functions such as 
information integration to support decision making.  The constant development of new 
technologies will continue to drive new research ideas that are aimed at understanding the 
relationship between the characteristics of specific technologies and human behavior.  
However, research efforts that are simply reactionary initiatives to emerging technologies 
will “only brighten an inconsequential corner rather than contributing to the science” 
(Adams, 1987; p. 41).  Therefore, the following are some suggestions about the paths that 
should be traveled by future research efforts and the factors that those efforts should 
consider: 
• We must begin to ask WHY the manipulations of specific variables lead to specific 
changes in behavior.  For example, simply noting that changes in the reliability of an 
automated system lead to changes in reliance without asking why, merely provides a 
surface level understanding of the factors that affect use in automation.  A deeper 
interpretation of the results of our experiments will force us to pay more attention to 
small but important details that appear to moderate and mediate some of the 
behaviors being observed.  For example, one key variable that is often overlooked by 
researchers when drawing conclusions from previous research efforts and generating 
new experiments is the amount of information about the reliability of the automation 
that participants receive (See Sanchez, 2005 for a review).  This variable alone 
 
 109
appears to be an important moderator and/or mediator of the effects that factors such 
as reliability have on trust and reliance. 
• Efforts to generate conceptual and statistical models that describe and extend what we 
know about human-automation interaction need to continue.  The development of 
conceptual and statistical models will allow us to more easily detect the relationships 
that we do not yet understand and highlight what we do understand. 
• We must realize that the term automation covers a wide spectrum of systems, which 
range from very “simple” sensing technologies to complex decision support aids.  
The existing taxonomies of automation (Endsley& Kaber, 1999; Parasuraman et al., 
2000; Sheridan & Verplank, 1978) provide a solid starting point, but are not sufficient 
to classify the numerous variables specific to different types of automation that can 
affect human behavior.  Developing a more comprehensive taxonomy of automation 
will facilitate the interpretation and organization of results from studies that use 















Figure A1. Reliance data from Johnson (2004). The top graph shows the non-reliance 
behavior during alerts by the decision support aid and the bottom graph shows non-
reliance behavior during times when the decision support aid was not alerting.  The 




































































































PARTICIPANT CHARACTERISTICS BY ERROR TYPE (EXPERIMENT 1) 
 
Table B1. Participant characteristics by Error Type Condition (Experiment 1) 










  Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
     False Alarms 23.5 2.6 9.3 2.1 29.1 3.1 62.8 9.8 5.8 1.5 
     Misses 22.8 3.3 9.5 2.0 28.5 3.0 62.5 9.6 6.7 1.3 
*1 Number of correct items (maximum 20); *2 Number of correct items (maximum 40); *3 Number of 





DISTRIBUTION OF ERRORS 
 
Table C1. Distribution of errors 
Time bin Throughout First half Second half 
1 correct rejection correct rejection correct rejection 
2 correct rejection correct rejection correct rejection 
3 correct rejection correct rejection correct rejection 
4 correct alarm correct alarm correct alarm 
5 correct rejection correct rejection correct rejection 
6 correct rejection correct rejection correct rejection 
7 correct rejection correct rejection correct rejection 
8 error error correct alarm 
9 correct rejection correct rejection correct rejection 
10 correct rejection correct rejection correct rejection 
11 correct alarm correct alarm correct alarm 
12 correct rejection correct rejection correct rejection 
13 correct rejection correct rejection correct rejection 
14 correct alarm correct alarm correct alarm 
15 correct rejection correct rejection correct rejection 
16 correct alarm error correct alarm 
17 correct alarm correct alarm correct alarm 
18 correct rejection correct rejection correct rejection 
19 error error correct alarm 
20 correct alarm correct alarm correct alarm 
21 correct rejection correct rejection correct rejection 
22 correct alarm correct alarm correct alarm 
23 correct rejection correct rejection correct rejection 
24 correct alarm correct alarm correct alarm 
25 correct rejection correct rejection correct rejection 
26 correct alarm correct alarm correct alarm 
27 correct rejection correct rejection correct rejection 
28 correct rejection correct rejection correct rejection 
29 correct rejection correct rejection correct rejection 
30 correct alarm error correct alarm 
31 correct rejection correct rejection correct rejection 
32 correct rejection correct rejection correct rejection 
33 correct rejection correct rejection correct rejection 
34 correct rejection correct rejection correct rejection 
35 correct alarm correct alarm correct alarm 
36 correct rejection correct rejection correct rejection 
37 correct rejection correct rejection correct rejection 
38 correct rejection correct rejection correct rejection 
39 correct rejection correct rejection correct rejection 
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40 correct rejection correct rejection correct rejection 
41 error error correct alarm 
42 correct rejection correct rejection correct rejection 
43 correct rejection correct rejection correct rejection 
44 correct alarm correct alarm correct alarm 
45 correct rejection correct rejection correct rejection 
46 correct alarm correct alarm correct alarm 
47 correct rejection correct rejection correct rejection 
48 correct alarm correct alarm correct alarm 
49 correct rejection correct rejection correct rejection 
50 correct rejection correct rejection correct rejection 
51 correct rejection correct rejection correct rejection 
52 correct rejection correct rejection correct rejection 
53 correct alarm correct alarm correct alarm 
54 correct rejection correct rejection correct rejection 
55 correct rejection correct rejection correct rejection 
56 correct alarm error correct alarm 
57 correct rejection correct rejection correct rejection 
58 correct rejection correct rejection correct rejection 
59 correct rejection correct rejection correct rejection 
60 correct rejection correct rejection correct rejection 
61 correct rejection correct rejection correct rejection 
62 correct rejection correct rejection correct rejection 
63 correct rejection correct rejection correct rejection 
64 correct rejection correct rejection correct rejection 
65 correct rejection correct rejection correct rejection 
66 correct rejection correct rejection correct rejection 
67 error error correct alarm 
68 correct rejection correct rejection correct rejection 
69 correct alarm correct alarm correct alarm 
70 correct rejection correct rejection correct rejection 
71 correct alarm correct alarm correct alarm 
72 correct rejection correct rejection correct rejection 
73 correct rejection correct rejection correct rejection 
74 correct rejection correct rejection correct rejection 
75 correct rejection correct rejection correct rejection 
76 correct alarm correct alarm correct alarm 
77 correct rejection correct rejection correct rejection 
78 correct rejection correct rejection correct rejection 
79 correct rejection correct rejection correct rejection 
80 correct rejection correct rejection correct rejection 
81 correct rejection correct rejection correct rejection 
82 correct alarm correct alarm correct alarm 
83 correct rejection correct rejection correct rejection 
84 correct rejection correct rejection correct rejection 
85 correct alarm correct alarm correct alarm 
86 correct rejection correct rejection correct rejection 
87 correct rejection correct rejection correct rejection 
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88 correct rejection correct rejection correct rejection 
89 correct alarm error correct alarm 
90 correct rejection correct rejection correct rejection 
91 correct rejection correct rejection correct rejection 
92 correct rejection correct rejection correct rejection 
93 correct rejection correct rejection correct rejection 
94 correct alarm correct alarm correct alarm 
95 correct rejection correct rejection correct rejection 
96 correct rejection correct rejection correct rejection 
97 correct rejection correct rejection correct rejection 
98 correct alarm correct alarm correct alarm 
99 correct rejection correct rejection correct rejection 
100 correct alarm correct alarm correct alarm 
101 correct rejection correct rejection correct rejection 
102 correct alarm correct alarm correct alarm 
103 correct rejection correct rejection correct rejection 
104 correct rejection correct rejection correct rejection 
105 error error correct alarm 
106 correct rejection correct rejection correct rejection 
107 correct rejection correct rejection correct rejection 
108 correct rejection correct rejection correct rejection 
109 correct rejection correct rejection correct rejection 
110 correct rejection correct rejection correct rejection 
111 correct alarm error correct alarm 
112 correct rejection correct rejection correct rejection 
113 correct rejection correct rejection correct rejection 
114 correct rejection correct rejection correct rejection 
115 correct rejection correct rejection correct rejection 
116 correct alarm exception error correct alarm 
117 correct rejection correct rejection correct rejection 
118 correct rejection correct rejection correct rejection 
119 correct rejection correct rejection correct rejection 
120 correct rejection correct rejection correct rejection 
121 correct rejection correct rejection correct rejection 
122 correct rejection correct rejection correct rejection 
123 correct rejection correct rejection correct rejection 
124 correct rejection correct rejection correct rejection 
125 correct rejection correct rejection correct rejection 
126 correct alarm correct alarm correct alarm 
127 correct rejection correct rejection correct rejection 
128 error correct alarm error 
129 correct rejection correct rejection correct rejection 
130 correct rejection correct rejection correct rejection 
131 correct alarm correct alarm correct alarm 
132 correct rejection correct rejection correct rejection 
133 correct rejection correct rejection correct rejection 
134 correct alarm correct alarm correct alarm 
135 correct rejection correct rejection correct rejection 
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136 correct alarm correct alarm error 
137 correct rejection correct rejection correct rejection 
138 correct rejection correct rejection correct rejection 
139 error correct alarm error 
140 correct rejection correct rejection correct rejection 
141 correct rejection correct rejection correct rejection 
142 correct alarm correct alarm correct alarm 
143 correct rejection correct rejection correct rejection 
144 correct alarm correct alarm correct alarm 
145 correct rejection correct rejection correct rejection 
146 correct alarm correct alarm correct alarm 
147 correct rejection correct rejection correct rejection 
148 correct rejection correct rejection correct rejection 
149 correct rejection correct rejection correct rejection 
150 correct alarm correct alarm error 
151 correct rejection correct rejection correct rejection 
152 correct rejection correct rejection correct rejection 
153 correct rejection correct rejection correct rejection 
154 correct rejection correct rejection correct rejection 
155 correct alarm correct alarm correct alarm 
156 correct rejection correct rejection correct rejection 
157 correct rejection correct rejection correct rejection 
158 correct rejection correct rejection correct rejection 
159 correct rejection correct rejection correct rejection 
160 correct rejection correct rejection correct rejection 
161 error correct alarm error 
162 correct rejection correct rejection correct rejection 
163 correct rejection correct rejection correct rejection 
164 correct alarm correct alarm correct alarm 
165 correct rejection correct rejection correct rejection 
166 correct alarm correct alarm correct alarm 
167 correct rejection correct rejection correct rejection 
168 correct alarm correct alarm correct alarm 
169 correct rejection correct rejection correct rejection 
170 correct rejection correct rejection correct rejection 
171 correct rejection correct rejection correct rejection 
172 correct alarm correct alarm correct alarm 
173 correct rejection correct rejection correct rejection 
174 correct rejection correct rejection correct rejection 
175 correct rejection correct rejection correct rejection 
176 correct alarm correct alarm error 
177 correct rejection correct rejection correct rejection 
178 correct rejection correct rejection correct rejection 
179 correct rejection correct rejection correct rejection 
180 correct rejection correct rejection correct rejection 
181 correct rejection correct rejection correct rejection 
182 correct rejection correct rejection correct rejection 
183 correct rejection correct rejection correct rejection 
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184 correct rejection correct rejection correct rejection 
185 correct rejection correct rejection correct rejection 
186 correct rejection correct rejection correct rejection 
187 error correct alarm error 
188 correct rejection correct rejection correct rejection 
189 correct alarm correct alarm correct alarm 
190 correct rejection correct rejection correct rejection 
191 correct alarm correct alarm correct alarm 
192 correct rejection correct rejection correct rejection 
193 correct rejection correct rejection correct rejection 
194 correct rejection correct rejection correct rejection 
195 correct rejection correct rejection correct rejection 
196 correct alarm correct alarm correct alarm 
197 correct rejection correct rejection correct rejection 
198 correct rejection correct rejection correct rejection 
199 correct rejection correct rejection correct rejection 
200 correct rejection correct rejection correct rejection 
201 correct rejection correct rejection correct rejection 
202 correct alarm correct alarm correct alarm 
203 correct rejection correct rejection correct rejection 
204 correct rejection correct rejection correct rejection 
205 correct alarm correct alarm correct alarm 
206 correct rejection correct rejection correct rejection 
207 correct rejection correct rejection correct rejection 
208 correct rejection correct rejection correct rejection 
209 correct alarm correct alarm error 
210 correct rejection correct rejection correct rejection 
211 correct rejection correct rejection correct rejection 
212 correct rejection correct rejection correct rejection 
213 correct rejection correct rejection correct rejection 
214 correct alarm correct alarm correct alarm 
215 correct rejection correct rejection correct rejection 
216 correct rejection correct rejection correct rejection 
217 correct rejection correct rejection correct rejection 
218 correct alarm correct alarm correct alarm 
219 correct rejection correct rejection correct rejection 
220 correct alarm correct alarm correct alarm 
221 correct rejection correct rejection correct rejection 
222 correct alarm correct alarm correct alarm 
223 correct rejection correct rejection correct rejection 
224 correct rejection correct rejection correct rejection 
225 correct alarm correct alarm error 
226 correct rejection correct rejection correct rejection 
227 correct rejection correct rejection correct rejection 
228 correct rejection correct rejection correct rejection 
229 correct rejection correct rejection correct rejection 
230 correct rejection correct rejection correct rejection 
231 exception error correct alarm exception error 
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232 correct rejection correct rejection correct rejection 
233 correct rejection correct rejection correct rejection 
234 correct rejection correct rejection correct rejection 
235 correct rejection correct rejection correct rejection 
236 correct rejection correct rejection correct rejection 
237 correct rejection correct rejection correct rejection 
238 correct rejection correct rejection correct rejection 
239 correct rejection correct rejection correct rejection 





SUBJECTIVE TRUST AND PERCEIVED RELIABILITY QUESTIONNAIRE 
 




1. Overall how much do you trust the Collision Avoidance System? 
 
     1                   2                    3                    4                    5                   6                 7 






2. To what extent can you count on the Collision Avoidance System to do its job? 
 
   1                   2                    3                    4                    5                   6                 7 





3. Please indicate, using a number, your estimate of the reliability of the Collision 
Avoidance System 







PARTICIPANT CHARACTERISITICS BY AGE, ERROR TYPE AND 
DISTRIBUTION OF ERRORS (EXPERIMENT 2) 
 












  Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Younger Adults           
     False Alarms 19.6 2.2 11.3 2.2 31.7 4.5 74.9 7.4 7.0 1.8 
     Misses 19.1 1.3 11.1 1.7 30.9 4.2 72.0 6.7 7.1 1.6 
Older Adults           
     False Alarms 69.5 3.2 7.6 1.7 33.8 3.1 59.0 9.3 5.2 0.9 
     Misses 69.3 4.5 8.1 1.9 33.8 6.4 52.8 14.9 4.3 1.7 
*1 Number of correct items (maximum 20); *2 Number of correct items (maximum 40); *3 Number of 
completed items (maximum 100); *4 Number of digits recalled in the correct order (maximum 14) 
 
 
Table E2. Participant characteristics by Age and Error Type for the First Half Condition 
  








  Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Younger Adults           
     False Alarms 19.5 1.4 10.1 1.9 29.8 2.8 76.4 8.7 7.3 1.6 
     Misses 19.4 1.4 11.4 1.4 28.6 3.6 75.8 9.2 7.1 2.1 
Older Adults           
     False Alarms 70.3 4.0 8.1 2.1 34.7 4.3 53.8 8.0 5.3 0.8 
     Misses 71.3 2.8 7.3 1.9 34.5 2.4 60.0 11.5 5.0 1.2 
*1 Number of correct items (maximum 20); *2 Number of correct items (maximum 40); *3 Number of 


















  Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Younger Adults           
     False Alarms 19.7 1.9 10.2 1.9 29.5 3.4 74.8 7.7 6.7 1.8 
     Misses 19.8 1.3 10.2 2.1 29.8 5.5 70.6 8.8 6.3 2.0 
Older Adult           
     False Alarms 67.7 2.5 9.0 1.9 34.0 3.1 49.4 12.7 5.2 1.2 
     Misses 69.6 3.3 8.8 1.8 34.3 5.5 48.1 14.5 4.9 1.1 
*1 Number of correct items (maximum 20); *2 Number of correct items (maximum 40); *3 Number of 





ANOVA TABLE (EXPERIMENT 2) 
 
Table F1. ANOVA table (Experiment 2) 
Source Dependent Variable SS df MS F p 
Spacebars 572.0 1 572.0 .04 .839 
First spacebars 658.0 1 658.0 .25 .615 
Total spacebar time* 20399.4 1 20399.4 11.00 .001 
Spacebars during alarms* 715.4 1 715.4 10.55 .002 
Spacebars during non-alarms 2650.8 1 2650.8 1.21 .274 
Trust* 20.0 1 20.0 17.96 .000 
Perceived reliability* 585.2 1 585.2 4.59 .034 
Collision errors* 392.4 1 392.4 28.16 .000 
False negative rate* .0 1 .0 16.89 .000 
False positive rate* .0 1 .0 27.45 .000 
Red events* 77114.7 1 77114.7 78.15 .000 
Tracking errors* 403.3 1 403.3 63.95 .000 
Digit substitution* 12281.6 1 12281.6 115.3 .000 
Shipley vocabulary* 512.5 1 512.5 29.12 .000 
Reverse digit* 112.1 1 112.1 49.96 .000 


















Participants’ age* 75300.3 1 75300.3 1x104 .000 
Spacebars 19712.0 1 19712.0 1.43 .234 
First spacebars* 25085.2 1 25085.2 9.70 .002 
Total spacebar time* 27808.6 1 27808.6 14.99 .000 
Spacebars during alarms* 3553.4 1 3553.4 52.40 .000 
Spacebars during non-alarms* 49207.5 1 49207.5 22.48 .000 
Trust* 16.9 1 16.9 15.15 .000 
Perceived reliability 161.0 1 161.0 1.26 .263 
Collision errors* 304.0 1 304.0 21.81 .000 
False negative rate* .1 1 .1 52.35 .000 
False positive rate* .0 1 .0 14.72 .000 
Red events* 10490.7 1 10490.7 10.63 .001 
Tracking errors* 48.1 1 48.1 7.63 .007 
Digit substitution 67.5 1 67.5 .63 .428 
Shipley vocabulary 2.1 1 2.1 .12 .728 
Reverse digit 3.3 1 3.3 1.49 .226 


















Participants’ age 4.0 1 4.0 .55 .459 
Spacebars 71368.8 2 35684.4 2.59 .079 
First spacebars* 19349.8 2 9674.9 3.74 .027 
Distribution of 
Errors 
  Total spacebar time* 16468.2 2 8234.1 4.44 .014 
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Spacebars during alarms* 1154.4 2 577.2 8.51 .000 
Spacebars during non-alarms 12371.5 2 6185.7 2.83 .064 
Trust* 50.5 2 25.2 22.65 .000 
Perceived reliability* 2474.1 2 1237.1 9.71 .000 
Collision errors 23.3 2 11.6 .83 .437 
False negative rate .0 2 .0 .90 .409 
False positive rate .0 2 .0 2.74 .069 
Red events 3665.9 2 1832.9 1.86 .161 
Tracking errors 7.3 2 3.7 .58 .562 
Digit substitution* 697.1 2 348.6 3.27 .042 
Shipley vocabulary 11.3 2 5.6 .32 .727 
Reverse digit 3.4 2 1.7 .75 .477 
















Participants’ age 19.3 2 9.7 1.33 .270 
Spacebars 4966.5 1 4966.5 .36 .549 
First spacebars 2367.4 1 2367.4 .92 .341 
Total spacebar time 1055.6 1 1055.6 .57 .452 
Spacebars during alarms 249.4 1 249.4 3.68 .058 
Spacebars during non-alarms 4662.5 1 4662.5 2.13 .147 
Trust 1.0 1 1.0 .91 .344 
Perceived reliability 99.0 1 99.0 .78 .380 
Collision errors 20.0 1 20.0 1.44 .233 
False negative rate* .0 1 .0 13.08 .000 
False positive rate* .0 1 .0 13.41 .000 
Red events* 4813.3 1 4813.3 4.88 .029 
Tracking errors 12.0 1 12.0 1.91 .170 
Digit substitution 34.1 1 34.1 .32 .572 
Shipley vocabulary 2.7 1 2.7 .15 .696 
Reverse digit .8 1 .8 .37 .544 
Paper folding 2.1 1 2.1 .60 .439 


















Participants’ age 8.5 1 8.5 1.17 .282 
Spacebars 11054.1 2 5527.1 .40 .670 
First spacebars 3585.6 2 1792.8 .69 .502 
Total spacebar time 3797.2 2 1898.6 1.02 .363 
Spacebars during alarms* 704.3 2 352.1 5.19 .007 
Spacebars during non-alarms 3509.5 2 1754.7 .80 .451 
Trust* 7.6 2 3.8 3.42 .036 
Perceived reliability* 1064.1 2 532.1 4.18 .018 
Collision errors 46.7 2 23.3 1.67 .192 
False negative rate .0 2 .0 .48 .618 
False positive rate* .0 2 .0 3.37 .038 
Red events 463.9 2 231.9 .24 .791 
Tracking errors 6.2 2 3.1 .49 .612 
Digit substitution 220.8 2 110.4 1.04 .358 
Shipley vocabulary 44.1 2 22.0 1.25 .290 



















  Paper folding 24.5 2 12.3 3.47 .035 
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 Participants’ age 30.1 2 15.0 2.06 .132 
Spacebars* 97367.6 2 48683.8 3.54 .032 
First spacebars* 56769.0 2 28384.5 10.98 .000 
Total spacebar time* 42528.8 2 21264.4 11.46 .000 
Spacebars during alarms* 1556.9 2 778.4 11.48 .000 
Spacebars during non-alarms* 39647.0 2 19823.5 9.06 .000 
Trust 4.9 2 2.4 2.18 .118 
Perceived reliability 341.3 2 170.7 1.34 .266 
Collision errors 70.1 2 35.0 2.51 .086 
False negative rate .0 2 .0 1.43 .244 
False positive rate .0 2 .0 2.96 .056 
Red events 5233.6 2 2616.8 2.65 .075 
Tracking errors 22.0 2 11.0 1.75 .179 
Digit substitution 293.6 2 146.8 1.38 .256 
Shipley vocabulary 5.3 2 2.6 .15 .861 
Reverse digit .1 2 .1 .03 .974 
Paper folding .7 2 .3 .09 .912 



















Participants’ age 9.2 2 4.6 .63 .533 
Spacebars 11626.5 2 5813.3 .42 .656 
First spacebars 8811.8 2 4405.9 1.70 .187 
Total spacebar time 10094.5 2 5047.2 2.72 .070 
Spacebars during alarms* 1150.9 2 575.4 8.49 .000 
Spacebars during non-alarms 4882.6 2 2441.3 1.12 .332 
Trust 2.2 2 1.1 1.00 .373 
Perceived reliability 198.3 2 99.2 .78 .462 
Collision errors 13.1 2 6.5 .47 .627 
False negative rate .0 2 .0 .32 .728 
False positive rate* .0 2 .0 4.47 .014 
Red events 810.8 2 405.4 .41 .664 
Tracking errors .1 2 .1 .01 .991 
Digit substitution 129.7 2 64.9 .61 .546 
Shipley vocabulary 1.4 2 .7 .04 .961 
Reverse digit 1.7 2 .9 .38 .683 
Paper folding 10.2 2 5.1 1.45 .240 



















  Participants’ age 2.8 2 1.4 .19 .825 





CORRELATIONS TABLE (EXPERIMENT 2) 
  
Table G1. Correlations table (Experiment 2) 
 
First 











spacebars .94** .41** .90** -.27** -.17 -.43 .17 
First 
spacebars 
 .42** .96** -.24** -.13 -.35 .15 
Spacebars 
(alarms) 





  -.34** -.17 -.29** .14 
Trust 
ratings 
    .54** .16 .08 
Perceived 
reliability 
     .02 -.02 
Number of 
errors 
      .33** 





ANOVA TABLE (EXPERIMENT 1) 
 
Table H1. ANOVA table (Experiment 1) 
Source Dependent Variable SS df MS F p 
Spacebars 90.0 1 90.0 .01 .924
First spacebars 144.4 1 144.4 .06 .811
Total spacebar time* 29268.1 1 29268.1 7.14 .011
Spacebars during alarms* 555.0 1 555.0 11.89 .001
Spacebars during non-alarms 1357.2 1 1357.2 .63 .433
Trust .4 1 .4 .26 .616
Perceived reliability 2.5 1 2.5 .02 .896
Collision errors 3.6 1 3.6 .84 .365
False negative rate .0 1 .0 1.58 .216
False positive rate .0 1 .0 3.06 .089
Red events 115.6 1 115.6 .37 .548
Digit substitution* 1166.4 1 1166.4 16.18 .000
Shipley vocabulary* 62.5 1 62.5 4.50 .041
Reverse digit 6.4 1 6.4 2.66 .112
Paper folding* 32.4 1 32.4 8.12 .007



















Domain experience* 490.0 1 490.0 132.6 .000
Spacebars 14745.6 1 14745.6 1.53 .224
First spacebars* 18147.6 1 18147.6 7.29 .010
Total spacebar time 15792.7 1 15792.7 3.85 .057
Spacebars during alarms* 2739.0 1 2739.0 58.67 .000
Spacebars during non-alarms* 35343.0 1 35343.0 16.39 .000
Trust .9 1 .9 .58 .453
Perceived reliability 108.9 1 108.9 .76 .390
Collision errors* 32.4 1 32.4 7.57 .009
False negative rate* .0 1 .0 9.49 .004
False positive rate 9E-005 1 9E-005 2.57 .118
Red events* 2592.1 1 2592.1 8.26 .007
Digit substitution 25.6 1 25.6 .36 .555
Shipley vocabulary 4.9 1 4.9 .35 .556
Reverse digit 2.5 1 2.5 1.04 .315
Paper folding .0 1 .0 .00 1.000


















Experience* 22.5 1 22.5 6.09 .018
Spacebars 230.4 1 230.4 .02 .878Agricultural 
Experience * First spacebars 25.6 1 25.6 .01 .920
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Total spacebar time 423.8 1 423.8 .10 .750
Spacebars during alarms 75.6 1 75.6 1.62 .211
Spacebars during non-alarms 216.2 1 216.2 .10 .753
Trust 1.6 1 1.6 1.02 .318
Perceived reliability 2.5 1 2.5 .02 .896
Collision errors* 32.4 1 32.4 7.57 .009
False negative rate .0 1 .0 2.77 .105
False positive rate .0 1 .0 1.30 .262
Red events 129.6 1 129.6 .41 .524
Digit substitution 16.9 1 16.9 .23 .631
Shipley vocabulary .1 1 .1 .01 .933
Reverse digit 1.6 1 1.6 .67 .420
Paper folding .4 1 .4 .10 .753


















Experience* 22.5 1 22.5 6.09 .018






“FIRST ERROR EFFECT” 
 
The y-axes represent the difference in the number of participants who pressed the 
spacebar before and after each error.  A positive number on the y-axis indicates a change 
toward non-reliance and a negative number toward reliance. The x-axes represent each 












Figure I1.  Changes in the number of participants who pressed the spacebar before and 











































Figure I2. Changes in the number of participants who pressed the spacebar before and 





















Figure I3.  Changes in the number of participants who pressed the spacebar before and 











































































Figure I4.  Changes in the number of participants who pressed the spacebar before and 























Figure I5.  Changes in the number of participants who pressed the spacebar before and 










































































Figure I6.  Changes in the number of participants who pressed the spacebar before and 





Table I1. Changes in the number of Younger Adults in Experiment 2 who pressed the 
spacebar before and after the first automation error.  
 
 During Alarms During Non-alarms 








Throughout 0 0 0 +1 
First half +3 -1 0 -4 












































Figure J1. Conceptual model of human-automation interaction 
System Performance
1. Probability of 
correct outcome
2. Probability of correct 




























































TECHNICAL TERMS & DEFINITIONS 
 
 
• Actual reliability: Describes the true or actual reliability of the automation.  Reliability is 
calculated by dividing the number of events in which the automation provides correct support 
by the total number of events in which the automation provides support.  For example, a 
system that is “60% reliable” would generate 6 correct responses out of 10. 
• Appropriate reliance/trust: A match between the actual capabilities of the automation and the 
perceived capabilities by the human.  Instances of appropriate reliance refer to situations in 
which the human correctly chooses to use or not use the automation based on knowledge they 
have about its capabilities (Lee & See, 2004).   
• Automation error: An event for which the automation fails to provide accurate support.  For 
example, in automated decision support systems, errors usually consist of false alarms and 
misses.   
• Automation reliability: see actual reliability 
• Automation: a technologically-based system used to partially or fully assist the human in 
tasks involving sensing, detecting, processing information, making decisions and/or 
executing actions.  In this document, the word automation generally used to describe a system 
that helps sense, process information, and make decisions.     
• Decision support aid: A type of automated system that is designed to help humans make 
decisions faster, more accurately, and/or with less effort.   
• Distribution of errors: Within this investigation, this variable describes the distribution of 
errors as a function of time.   
• Error type: Within this investigation, it described the two types of errors that a decision 
support aid can make (false alarms and misses) 
o False alarm: Occurs when the automation generates a warning or alert in the absence 
of a true signal. 
o Miss: Occurs when the automation fails to notify the human of a true signal. 
• Levels of Automation (LOA): The level of support that an automated system provides.  
Parasuraman et al. (2000) suggested that there are four levels of automation: information 
acquisition, information analysis, decision/action selection, and action implementation. 
• Perceived reliability: A subjective measure commonly used in human-automation interaction 
studies.  It is an estimate of the automation’s reliability by participants.  
• Reliability: See Actual reliability 
• Reliance: Within this study it is the behavior of agreeing with the automation without 
verifying other sources of information. 
• System error: Within this document, the term system is used to describe the human-
automation team or system.  Therefore a system error is an instance in which the wrong 
output is generated by the system, irrespective of which of the system components (human or 
automation) caused it.      
• Trust in automation: Generally defined as one’s willingness to use the automation in the face 
of uncertainty.  Trust is often measured subjectively by asking participants to provide a rating 
of their trust in the automation.  Objective proxies for trust in automation are objective 
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